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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Research question
The main focus of this dissertation is to examine whether and how individual 
managerial differences and their social context affect earnings quality. 
Earnings quality, as an important component of financial reporting quality, is of 
considerable interest to financial information users, standard setters, regulators as well 
as accounting researchers (Francis, Olsson, and Schipper 2006). Extant research on 
earnings quality has studied the determinants of earnings quality, including innate 
factors originating from fundamental economic forces, and discretionary factors (Lev 
1983; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2004).  
Innate factors such as firm size, cash flow variability, sales variability, operating 
cycle, firm’s incidence of negative earnings realizations, intangible intensity, capital 
intensity  and  industry  can  account  for  between  50%-70%  of  the  variation  in  the 
earnings  quality  metric  (e.g.,  see  Dechow  and  Dichev  2002;  Francis  et  al.  2006; 
Francis, Nanda, and Olsson 2008). Turning to discretionary factors, researchers find 
that the following influence earnings quality:
1 manager’s incentives (e.g, see DeFond 
and Jiambalvo 1994; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 
1999;  Baker,  Collins,  and  Reitenga  2003;  Bartov  and  Mohanram  2004;  Graham, 
Harvey,  and  Rajgopal  2005;  McAnally,  Srivastava,  and  Weaver  2008),  corporate 
governance  structure  (e.g.,  see  Dechow,  Sloan,  and  Sweeney  1996;  Bushman  and 
Smith 2001; Fan and Wong 2002; Klein 2002; Wang 2006; Bowen, Rajgopal, and 
Venkatachalam 2008), auditing (e.g., see Wild 1996; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998), 
regulation and investor protection (e.g., see Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Cohen, 
Dey, and Lys 2008; Francis and Wang 2008).  
Together all these studies have contributed significantly to the literature and have 
advanced  our  understanding  about  the  determinants  of  earnings  quality;  however, 
substantial  variation  in firm  reporting  practices  remains  after  controlling  for  these 
identified economic determinants (Bowen et al. 2008; Francis, Huang, Rajgopal, and 
Zang 2008).  
                                                       
1 References listed here are just for illustrative purpose; please refer each of the individual chapters for 
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One of the fruitful research avenues to tackle this question further is to consider     
the  influence  of  managers  in  more  detail,  especially  the  individual  differences 
between those managers involved in reporting and the influence of peer managers as a 
proxy for the social context of managers (Noreen 1988; Luft 1997; Sprinkle 2003; 
Huddart  and  Fischer  2008).  Individual  differences  are  often  defined  in  terms  of 
personal preferences for honesty, ethics and social values etc. (Van Lange, Otten, De 
Bruin, and Joireman 1997; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and 
Moser 2001; Stevens 2002). While peer influence is largely unexplored in accounting 
context, its influence on managerial reporting is likely given both anecdotal evidence
2 
and prior work in other fields (see, e.g., Bernheim 1994; Barron and Gjerde 1997; 
Slemrod 2004; Huddart and Fischer 2008).  
 
1.2 Research method 
In  this  dissertation,  I  employ  both  experimental  and  archival  data  research 
methods and measure  my variables of interests in multiple ways. The reasons for 
these choices follow.  
First,  for  this  exploratory  study,  existing  and  purpose  developed  proxies  for 
earnings quality and for the influence of managers may contain measurement error 
especially when based on archival data — the direct consequence is that a causal 
relationship  between  dependent  and  independent  variables  cannot  be  ensured  and 
statistical results suffer from attenuation bias. Using an experimental approach can 
overcome these weaknesses (Sprinkle 2003). But experiments also may not capture all 
relevant aspects of the population and thus have the problem of generalizing results to 
non-laboratory conditions (Luft 1997; Sprinkle 2003). Cognizant of these problems, I 
first run an experiment to study how managerial types together with other variables 
influence  managerial  reporting  behavior  and  then  use  archival  data  to  investigate 
whether managers who reveal certain traits indeed show significant influence on their 
financial reporting choices.  
Second, there is no consensus on how to define and measure earnings quality and 
the influence of managers (individual differences as well as peer behavior). Earnings 
quality is generally defined from different user perspectives. In order to get a more 
                                                       
2 In  a  broader  sense,  peer-group  behavior  can  lead  to  a  corporate  culture  that  is  either  benign  or 
malignant. The documentary “The smartest guys in the room” on the ENRON affair suggests that this 
firm was rife with unethical behavior. Being dishonest was the norm and deviating from this behavior 
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comprehensive measure of earnings quality, I measure earnings quality in multiple 
ways.  In  Chapter  2,  using  an  experimental  approach,  I  measure  earnings  quality 
directly by the extent of truthfulness in managerial reporting. In Chapter 3, following 
Francis et al. (2004), I use seven measures of earnings quality (which they define as 
earnings attributes). In the same chapter, I also use quality diagnostic tests based on 
accounting  ratios  adopted  from  Penman  (2007).  In  Chapter  4,  from  an  earnings 
management perspective, I examine earnings quality as managerial reporting behavior 
vis-a-vis  earnings  benchmarks  (e.g,  positive  earnings,  last  year’s  earnings  and 
analysts’ expectations). Turning to my independent variables, in Chapter 2, as the 
main variable of interest, the peer managers influence is manipulated and measured 
directly; individual differences of managers are measured according to social value 
orientation scores developed by prior researchers (Van Lange et al. 1997; Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999; Fehr and Schmidt 2003; Handgraaf, Dijk, Wilke, and Vermunt 2004). 
In Chapter 3 and 4, the context of the stock option backdating scandal is used to 
identify individual differences of managers.  
Though  the  main  focus  of  this  dissertation  is  to  investigate  the  influence  of 
managers on earnings quality, I also try to shed light on the validity and consistency 
of earnings quality measures and on the effect of other factors on earnings quality, 
such as incentive compensation and audit effectiveness. 
 
1.3 A preview of the main findings  
Chapter 2 is entitled Honesty is the best policy—when there is money in it: can 
firms  promote  honest  reporting  behavior  by  managers?   This  study  provides 
experimental evidence on how incentive compensation, peer managers behavior, and 
audit team effectiveness influence managerial reporting behavior. The results show 
that an increase in incentive compensation intensity induces subjects to report less 
truthfully,  a  high  level  of  peer  honesty  promotes  truthful  reporting  (this  effect  is 
weaker,  however,  when  incentive  compensation  intensity is  high),  and  audit  team 
effectiveness shows no significant influence on reporting behavior. Pro-self managers, 
as classified according to social value orientation scores, always report less truthfully 
compared with pro-social managers.  
Chapter 3 is entitled Top level executive characteristics and earnings attributes. I 
use  the  context  of  the  stock  option  backdating  scandal  to  explore  how  individual 
manager  differences  affect  the  quality  of  financial  statements.  I  argue  that  the 4                                            Essays on the Role of Managerial Type in Financial Reporting 
 
revealed type of “backdating” managers is such that they will have lower earnings 
quality.  Using  earnings  attributes  described  in  Francis  et  al.  (2004),  I  document 
indeed “backdating” firms have lower accrual quality, smoothness, and timeliness. 
However, I also find that “backdating” firms have higher persistence, predictability, 
and conservatism. In an effort to resolve some of the ambiguity from the earnings 
attributes tests, I compare accounting-based ratios that have been identified in prior 
work  as  quality  diagnostics  between  “backdating”  firms  and  size  and  industry 
matched  competitor  firms.  I  show  that  based  on  these  quality  diagnostics, 
“backdating” firms book revenues more aggressively, have low expenses compared 
with  their  sales  activities,  report  higher  profit  margins  and  lower  asset  turnover. 
Together, the accounting quality of “backdating” firms is significantly lower than the 
quality of their peers. I conclude that individual differences of top managers are a 
significant explanatory factor for the reporting behavior of firms. 
Chapter  4  is  entitled  To  miss  or  to  meet  earnings  benchmarks?  Earnings 
management of firms involved in stock option backdating. Prior literature provides 
evidence that managers have incentives to meet or beat some earnings benchmarks 
and are being rewarded by markets for doing so (Lopez and Rees 2002; Skinner and 
Sloan  2002).  Managers  also  have  incentives  to  miss  their  earnings  targets  for  the 
benefit of lower strike prices on subsequent option grants (McAnally, Srivastava, and 
Weaver  2008).  Controlling  for  firms’  economic  fundamentals,  both  just 
meeting/beating and just missing earnings benchmarks are consistent with earnings 
management and may bring negative consequences to other stakeholders. I expect 
managers who illegally backdated their option grants are less concerned about the 
negative consequence on other stakeholders of the company and are more likely to 
just meet/beat or just miss earnings target. I find that “backdating” firms are more 
likely to meet or narrowly beat all three earnings benchmarks examined in the paper: 
positive  earnings,  last  year’s  earnings  and  analysts’  forecasts.  Contrary  to  my 
expectations,  they  are  less  likely  to  miss  analysts’  forecasts.  The  evidence  is 
consistent  with  the  observations  that  “backdating”  managers  try  to  meet  the 
stakeholders’  expectations  and  avoid  costly  litigation  that  could  potentially  be 
triggered by unfavorable earnings surprises (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002). 
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1.4 Discussion, limitations and future research 
To summarize the results from the three essays: in addition to those innate and 
discretionary  factors  which  are  identified  in  prior  work,  both  peer  influence  and 
individual  managerial  differences  are  important  determinants  of  firms’  earnings 
quality. The overall results show that managers who are less concerned about the 
welfare of other people are more likely to engage in earnings management and have 
worse earnings quality.  
These  findings  have  to  be  considered  in  the  light  of  the  limitations  that  are 
inherent in empirical work. First, the concept of “managerial differences” is multi-
faceted  and  can  be  operationalized  in  many  ways.  This  study  defines  managerial 
differences based on whether managers are concerned about the negative consequence 
of  their  own  behaviors  to  other  people.  This  definition  may  not  fully  reflect  the 
relevant dimensions of managerial dispositions with regard to their reporting behavior. 
While the approach I offer in the two archival studies has the benefit of admitting 
broad-sample empirical analyses, future researchers may wish to use more refined 
measures of managerial type (differences).  
Second, I exploit a unique setting in my archival studies which allows for some 
powerful  tests.  At  the  same  time,  one  important  limitation  is  that  managerial 
differences  are  measured  ex  post,  as  “revealed  behavior”.  Relying  on  revealed 
behavior is somewhat problematic as—in my setting—it implies that I have to use a 
sub sample of managers who have demonstrated “extreme behavior”, i.e., those who 
are under investigation of fraud. It is not clear whether the behavior of these managers 
is very representative and can be used to answer questions about the influence of 
managerial type of a typical manager on reporting choices. An alternative approach 
would be to measure managerial differences ex ante, for example by using established 
survey instruments, but a survey approach often suffers from social desirability bias 
(Ganster,  Hennessey,  and  Luthans  1983).  Social  desirability  refers  to  people’s 
tendency to present themselves in a manner that will be viewed favorably by others. 
This bias is more likely given my research question.  
Third, the main conclusion is that managers who are involved in “backdating” are 
significantly  associated  with  worse  earnings  quality  in  terms  of  many  of  the  well 
accepted  measures,  but  for  some  earnings  quality  measures,  it  appears  that  the 
earnings quality of these “backdating” managers is actually not worse than that of 
other firms, and sometimes even better. These mixed findings have to be interpreted 6                                            Essays on the Role of Managerial Type in Financial Reporting 
 
in the light of the fundamental debate about the validity of the extant measure of 
earnings quality (McNichols 2002; Durtschi and Easton 2005, 2008). This debate is 
one of the reasons why I use multiple measures of earnings quality. In the current 
setting,  we  have  strong  priors  that  “backdating”  managers  are  prone  to  manage 
earnings. Given these priors, earnings attributes that behave in line with my priors 
about  the  predictions  of  these  managers  are  easier  to  accept  as  valid  proxies  for 
earnings management. Thus, my results have a bearing on which of these contested 
measures of earnings quality are valid. 
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Chapter  2:  Honesty  Is  the  Best  Policy–When  There  Is 
Money  in  It





Accounting regulators, investors, and media pundits alike have expressed growing 
concern about the apparent lack of honesty in firms’ financial reports. Given the many 
cases in which managers allegedly acted unethically, committed fraud, or simply did 
not  reveal  the  full  truth,  the  main  question  is:  what  can  be  done  to  ensure  that 
managers report truthfully? In this paper I investigate in an experimental setting how 
incentive compensation, peer-group behavior, and audit team effectiveness influence 
managerial reporting.  
As an interest-alignment tool between managers and firms, incentive compensation 
attracts a lot of attention. Recently, several authors (Bruner, McKee, and Santore 2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Denis, Hanouna, and Sarin 2006) have suggested 
that high incentive intensity may cause undesired reporting behavior within the legal 
boundary  and  even  beyond  (e.g.,  earnings  management  and  fraudulent  reporting). 
However,  other  researchers  (e.g.,  Erickson,  Hanlon,  and  Maydew  2006)  find  no 
consistent evidence that incentive compensation is associated with accounting fraud. 
Given  its  popularity  and  importance  in  practice  and  the  mixed  results  in  earlier 
research,  more  evidence  regarding  incentive  compensation’s  potential  to  cause 
undesirable reporting behavior is warranted.  
Accounting researchers have also explored and identified a number of behavioral 
factors that can promote the truthfulness of managerial reporting (e.g., Chow, Cooper, 
and Waller 1988; Evans et al. 2001; Stevens 2002; Stevens and Thevaranjan 2003; Yu 
2004; Stevens and Thevaranjan 2005; Hannan, Rankin, and Towry 2006). However,
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among the mechanisms considered, little attention has been given to the influence of 
peer-group reporting behavior on managerial honesty. Such a relation is likely given 
both anecdotal evidence and prior work in other fields (see, e.g., Bernheim 1994; 
Barron and Gjerde 1997; Slemrod 2004; Huddart and Fischer 2008). Accordingly, I 
examine  whether  peer-group  behavior  affects  the  extent  of  honesty  observed  in 
managerial reporting.  
Note that if one only examines the role of peer behavior, and ignores the role of 
more formal governance mechanisms such as audit committees, board monitoring, 
etc., the role of peer groups may be overstated (Sprinkle 2003).
5 I therefore include a 
formal governance mechanism in the analysis, which I operationalize in terms of audit 
team effectiveness.  
I use audit team effectiveness as my proxy for formal governance for two reasons. 
First, internal audit teams, viewed as the eyes and ears of a firm’s audit committee, 
are commonly used corporate governance mechanisms in practice; one of their most 
important  functions  is  to  assist  the  audit  committee  in  fulfilling  its  oversight 
responsibilities  with  respect  to  the  integrity  of  the  company’s financial  statement: 
“…the U.S. Congress place a great reliance on the company’s audit committee as a 
means of  protecting the integrity of financial reporting” (Carcello, Hollingsworth, 
Klein, and Neal 2006, 1). Second, the evidence on the relation between governance 
practice effectiveness and financial reporting behavior is mixed. On the one hand, 
some researchers (Peasnell, Pope, and Young 2000; Chtourou, Bedard, and Courteau 
2001; Klein 2002; Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt 2003; Carcello et al. 2006) find that an 
effective  board  and  audit  committee  (in  terms  of  board  composition,  board 
independence,  and  members’  financial  sophistication)  constrains  earnings 
management activities. On the other hand, Bowen et al. (2005) find that there is no 
clear  evidence  that  poor  governance  quality  is  related  to  managerial  accounting 
discretion. These conflicting results may be partly explained by the measurement of 
audit effectiveness and managerial accounting discretion. By using an experimental 
setting, I can measure more directly audit team effectiveness and its impact on the 
extent of misreporting.  
Turning  to  the  experiment’s  design,  I  conduct  an  experiment  in  which  subjects 
report a cost number to upper management. Management only knows the range for 
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this number, while subjects know the true cost. Subjects are paid based on a division’s 
profit, which is defined as the difference between output value and the reported cost 
of the project, creating an incentive to underreport the cost. The dependent variable is 
(the  degree  of)  honesty  in  a  manager’s  report,
6 i.e.,  the  extent  to  which  a  report 
accurately reflects the true costs (Evans et al. 2001; Hannan 2005; Hannan et al. 2006). 
Incentive  compensation  intensity  is  a  within-subject  factor;  subjects  receive  either 
50% or 10% of a division’s reported profit. The other two governance mechanisms 
studied  are  between-subject  factors.  Peer-group  behavior  is  manipulated  such  that 
peers are associated with either a high or a low level of honest reporting. Audit team 
effectiveness is manipulated such that the detection probability for misreporting is 
twice as high in the high effectiveness setting  as in the low effectiveness setting. 
Finally, I control for subjects’ gender and social value orientation (SVO) score in the 
analysis. SVO is known to influence an individual behavior’s in payoff distribution 
settings. Based on SVO scores, subjects are classified into pro-selves and pro-socials, 
where pro-selves are more concerned about their own outcomes, whereas pro-socials 
are concerned about the well-being of others. 
 The  results  suggest  that,  although  people  are  quite  truthful  in  making  their 
reporting decisions, there are incentives to misrepresent costs (in order to maximize 
compensation). Specifically, I find that managerial honesty decreases with incentive 
compensation  intensity  (i.e.,  managerial  honesty  is  lower  under  a  50%  incentive 
compensation scheme than under a 10% scheme). Managerial honesty is significantly 
higher, however, when subjects observe that the majority (75% to 90%) of their peers 
are honest. More importantly, the results show that these mechanisms interact with 
each other, with the effect of peer reporting behavior smaller when incentive intensity 
is high. With respect to audit team effectiveness, I find that this factor does not affect 
managerial honesty. Finally, I find that pro-social managers always make more honest 
reports  than  pro-self  managers;  and  I  also  find  that  male  participants  tend  to 
underreport true costs more than women when facing higher incentive intensity. 
This paper’s primary contributions to the literature are as follows.  First, while the 
three main factors of interest capture many of the mechanisms that have been put 
forward by regulators and academics to promote honest reporting behavior, to date 
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there is only limited empirical evidence on their effects. Thus, this paper adds to our 
knowledge on these factors’ impact on managerial reporting.  
Second,  while  several  recent  papers  make  considerable  contributions  toward 
integrating the insights of both economics and the behavioral sciences into accounting 
theories (see, e.g., Young 1985; Chow et al. 1988; Evans et al. 2001; Stevens 2002; 
Stevens and Thevaranjan 2003; Yu 2004) – an effort that is increasingly important 
following Evans et al.’s (2001) finding that neither conventional agency models nor 
types models
7 can explain reports that are “partially honest” – we know little about 
how  managers  balance  their  monetary  and  non-monetary  considerations  when 
deciding on the extent to which they will report honestly (Luft 1997; Evans et al. 2001; 
Sprinkle 2003). By analyzing both monetary (incentive compensation intensity) and 
non-monetary  (peer-group  behavior  and  audit  team  effectiveness)  governance 
mechanisms, this paper adds to the literature by investigating their possibly interactive 
influences on managerial reporting behavior. To the best of my knowledge, this is the 
first paper to study such interactive effects. 
Third,  the  results  reveal  that  research  on  truthful  managerial  reporting  may 
encounter an omitted variable bias without controlling for individual differences such 
as SVO and gender, since these variables do affect reporting behavior. 
 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
In this section  I  begin  by discussing my hypothesis for incentive compensation 
intensity. I then develop testable predictions for the two non-monetary governance 
mechanisms of interest, namely, peer honesty and audit team effectiveness. The third 
part of this section focuses on the interactive effects between incentive intensity and 
non-monetary governance mechanisms. Finally, I explain the control variables. 
2.2.1 Incentive compensation intensity 
Incentive  compensation,  generally  thought  to  be  effective  in  encouraging  and 
motivating  managers  to  work  harder,  is  commonly  used  in  an  effort  to  mitigate 
conflicts of interest between principals and managers. However, managers may also 
be motivated to increase their compensation at the expense of the firm. The more 
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incentive-intensive  compensation  is,  the  higher  the  payoff from  manipulating  firm 
performance  measures.  Consistent  with  this  argument,  Bergstresser  and  Philippon 
(2006)  provide  evidence  that  companies  with  more  “incentivized”  CEOs  observe 
higher levels of earnings management. In an experimental setting, Bruner et al. (2005) 
also  find  the  amount  of  managerial  fraud  committed  by  subjects  is  positively 
correlated with the (equity) incentive compensation of managers. However, Erickson 
et al. (2006) compare executive (equity) incentive compensation of firms accused of 
accounting  fraud  by  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (SEC)  during  the 
period  1996-2003  with  two  samples  of  firms  not  accused  of  fraud  and  find  no 
evidence to support the conjecture that (equity) incentive compensation is associated 
with fraud. Given the balance of evidence that incentive compensation has a negative 
effect on the truthfulness of managerial reports, I hypothesize that: 
 
H1. The truthfulness of a manager’s report is negatively influenced by incentive 
compensation intensity.  
 
2.2.2 Non-monetary governance mechanisms 
Peer managers’ reporting behavior: Both psychologists and economists believe 
that  individuals  conform  to  behavioral  norms  established  by  their  peers’  actions. 
According to this view, much of one’s behavior is influenced by his or her perceptions 
of what is "normal" or "typical". The reason is that individuals incur a lower cost (e.g., 
feelings of guilt or loss of self-respect) in undertaking an undesirable action when 
other  individuals  undertake  the  undesirable  action  as  well  (Rotter  1966;  Kohlberg 
1984; Huddart and Fischer 2008).   
While no study to date has examined directly the relation between peer managers’ 
behavior and truthful reporting, evidence in other fields is suggestive of the influence 
of  peers.  For  example,  tax  compliance  researchers  (Jackson  and  Milliron  1989; 
Trivedi, Shehata, and Lynn 2003) find that highly non-compliant peers reduce the 
compliance of other taxpayers, Zey-Ferrell et al. (1979) show that unethical decision-
making  by  marketing  managers  is  influenced  by  peer  behavior,  and  Huddart  and 
Fischer (2008) show how “established norms” or “peer pressure” can influence an 
individual’s (un)desirable actions (i.e., earnings manipulation by managers). Given 
this evidence, I hypothesize that:  
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H2. The truthfulness of a manager’s report is higher when peers report truthfully.  
 
Audit  team  effectiveness:  In  essence,  an  internal  audit  is  a  costly  investigation 
aimed  at  countering  opportunism  and  reducing  the  information  asymmetry  of 
managers vis-à-vis firm headquarters (Baiman 1990; Penno 1990; Baiman, Evans, and 
Nagarajan 1991; Boyle 1993; Kachelmeier and Shehata 1997). The internal auditing 
process typically consists of two potential stages. In the first stage, the audit team 
seeks to detect any opportunistic behavior; in the event opportunism is detected, a 
penalty may be considered in the second stage. I focus on the first stage and examine 
whether auditing effectiveness alone is sufficient to prevent opportunistic behavior.  
Studies on information systems are typically categorized according to whether they 
analyze  pre-  or  post-decision  information  (Baiman  and  Evans  1983;  Baiman  and 
Sivaramakrishnan  1991). 
8 In  the  setting  considered  in  this  paper,  increasing  the 
detection probability reduces the ex-post information asymmetry between managers 
and headquarters—it is only possible to establish whether managers have reported 
truthfully after they make their reports. While several studies investigate the effect of 
pre-decision  information  asymmetry  between  managers  and  headquarters  on 
budgetary slack and find mixed evidence (Young 1985; Chow et al. 1988; Stevens 
2002; Hannan et al. 2006), no extant evidence exists regarding ex-post information 
asymmetry. In the absence of prior evidence on this type of information asymmetry, I 
predict  that  increased  audit  effectiveness  increases  the  probability  that  untruthful 
reporting will be detected and in turn reduces (post-decision) information asymmetry, 
leading managers to report more truthfully.  More formally: 
 
H3. Audit team effectiveness has a positive effect on the truthfulness of managerial 
reporting.  
 
2.2.3 Interactive effects 
Koford and Penno (1992) argue that whether a person behaves ethically depends, to 
some extent, on how that person balances their self-interest against the interest of 
others or against some moral standards. Brickley et al. (1997) argue that the level of 
                                                       
8 Pre-decision information is information on which individuals can base their decisions. Conversely, 
post-decision information cannot be used for decision making because it arrives after the decision has 
been implemented (Baiman and Sivaramakrishnan, 1991, 747). 
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honesty  declines  as  the  payoff  to  lying  increases.  These  arguments  suggest  the 
presence  of  interactive  effects  between  incentive  compensation  and  the  other  two 
governance mechanisms examined in this paper.  
Consistent with these views, managers trade off their own wealth and the desire to 
behave  the  same  as  their  peers  when  their  peers  report  truthfully.  With  highly 
incentive-intensive contracts, the costs of following one’s peers are higher since doing 
so requires forgoing larger amounts of money. Accordingly, I predict that managers 
will  be  less  likely  to  follow  their  honest  peers  when  they  have  highly  incentive-
intensive contracts.  
Turning to the interaction between incentive compensation intensity and audit team 
effectiveness,  I  also  expect  that  the  effect  of  audit  team  effectiveness  on  truthful 
managerial reporting will be lower under stronger monetary incentives. Hannan et al. 
(2006) argue that a manager’s reporting decisions are affected by his tradeoff of the 
benefits of appearing honest against the benefits of misrepresentation. Because it is 
more costly for a manager to appear honest under stronger monetary incentives (since 
he has to forgo greater benefits of misreporting in order to achieve the same level of 
benefits associated with appearing honest), the prediction follows. More formally: 
 
 H4A. The effect of peer honesty on the truthfulness of managerial report is lower 
when incentive compensation intensity is high. 
H4B. The effect of audit team effectiveness on the truthfulness of managerial report 
is lower when incentive compensation intensity is high.  
 
Control Variables: Social Value Orientation (SVO) And Gender 
Social value orientation (SVO) 
 Individuals tend to differ systematically in their personal preference for a particular 
distribution  of  payoffs  to  themselves  and  another  party  (Messick  and  McClintock 
1968;  Kuhlman  and  Marshello  1975;  Liebrand,  Wilke,  Vogel,  and  Wolters  1986; 
McClintlock and Liebrand 1988; Van Lange et al. 1997; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Fehr 
and Schmidt 2003; Handgraaf et al. 2004). This personal preference is defined as 
social value orientation (SVO) (see Appendix C for the measurement of SVO). 
In  the  context  of  managerial  reporting,  I  expect  SVO  to  play  a  role  since  a 
manager’s reporting decisions will directly influence both his and the firm’s payoff. 
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(Van Lange et al. 1997). Pro-selfs are more concerned about their own well-being and 
the consequences of exploitation than they are about the well-being of others (Derlega 
and Grzelak 1982; Camac 1992; Van Lange et al. 1997; Nauta, Dreu, and Vaart 2002). 
In contrast, pro-socials are concerned about the well-being of others. Based on these 
classifications,  I  explore  whether  pro-self  managers  are  more  likely  to  report 
untruthfully in order to maximize their own payoff, and whether pro-social managers 
are  less  likely  to  benefit  themselves  at  the  expense  of  the  firm  by  reporting 
untruthfully.  
Gender 
A number of previous papers have found  gender differences in lying (DePaulo, 
Epstein, and Wyer 1993), aggressive behavior (Hyde 1984; Eagly and Steffen 1986) 
and social behavior (Wood 1987; Eagly and Wood 1991). Furthermore, gender has 
been found to influence reporting behavior (Schwartz and Wallin 2002). Due to the 
above reasons, gender is included as a control variable.  
 
2.3 Method and design 
I  conduct  a  computer-based  experiment  to  examine  the  factors  of  interest.  The 
experiment’s  design  is  adapted  from  several  studies  (Evans  et  al.  2001;  Hannan, 
Kagel, and Moser 2002; Yu 2004). All subjects are assumed to be division managers 
of a firm. They need to make cost reports to their headquarters. The incentive scheme 
induces untruthful reporting because the participants’ compensation is based on the 
profit of their divisions, which equals the division’s output value minus reported costs. 
Managers can maximize their wealth by underreporting the cost figures. Participants 
are paid based on the results across 10 rounds of play (experiment euros are converted 
to real money).  
2.3.1 Tasks 
In each round, division managers are responsible for an investment project. At the 
beginning  of  each  period,  the  headquarters  proposes  a  contract,  which  specifies  a 
manager’s compensation. The costs of the project range from 500 experimental euros 
(EE) to 2500 EE. Information asymmetry is present because the headquarters of the 
firm only knows that the costs of this project range between 500 and 2500 EE, with 
equal probability for each value within the range. The division manager learns the true 
cost of the project at the beginning of each period. Both division managers and the 
headquarters observe the project’s output value. The managers need to prepare a cost Chapter 2   Can Firms Promote Honest Reporting Behavior by Managers?               19 
 
report to submit to the headquarters. A manager’s payoff equals the compensation rate 
(set  by  the  headquarters)  multiplied  by  the  difference  between  output  value  and 
reported costs, that is, the manager’s payoff = compensation rate * (output value - 
reported costs). The manager can maximize his payoff by reporting a lower cost than 
the true costs. The company’s payoff is the project’s payoff minus the manager’s 
compensation, that is, a division’s contribution to firm profit = the project's payoff – 
the manager’s payoff.  Managers face a tradeoff between lying to maximize private 
wealth and reporting honestly to maximize firm profit. The output value and true cost 
for each round are randomly chosen within a certain range by the experimenter.  
2.3.2 Manipulations 
I  manipulate  all  three  of  the  experimental  factors.  The  intensity  of  incentive 
compensation is manipulated on a within-subject basis, and peer-group behavior and 
audit team effectiveness are manipulated on a between-subject basis. I elaborate on 
each of these manipulations in turn below. 
 
Incentive compensation intensity (IncenCompInt): Each subject participates in 10 
rounds of play. In each round, the manager’s compensation rate is specified by the 
headquarters to be either 10% or 50% of the reported division’s profit. The 10 rounds 
alternate  between  the  two  compensation  contracts,  with  each  subject  playing  five 
rounds  with  low  incentive  compensation  and  five  rounds  with  high  incentive 
compensation. Note that the rounds are balanced across sessions to control for order 
effects (i.e., either 10%-50% or 50%-10%). 
 
Peer Honesty (PeerHonst): In each round, subjects are provided information about 
their peer managers’ average reporting decision, where their peers are defined as a 
group  of  other  managers  of  approximately  the  same  status  (i.e.,  that  have  similar 
position, investment projects, compensation, decision rights, and operating setting). In 
the setting with high peer honesty, participants receive a message that about 75% to 
90% of their peer managers report a cost number that equals the true  cost of the 
investment. In contrast, in the setting with low peer honesty, participants receive a 
message that around 10% to 25% of their peer managers report a cost number that 
equals the true cost of the investment.  
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Audit  team  effectiveness  (AuditEfftv):  In  the  experimental  instructions,  subjects 
learn that the headquarters will send an audit team to their division to investigate their 
reported costs. In real life, a firm determines the effectiveness of an audit team and the 
effectiveness could be influenced by having more financial experts on the audit team. 
In the experiment, the headquarters determine whether the firm has a financial expert 
serving on its audit team. Subjects are not informed about the effectiveness of the 
audit team. All participants are informed that the audit team has some incomplete 
knowledge about the true costs of the project and will form an opinion (favorable or 
unfavorable) about the manager’s reported costs.  
The audit team is modeled to detect untruthful reporting with a given probability. 
Subjects do not receive information about the probability of detection; they learn this 
probability in the process of play. In the case of an audit team with low effectiveness, 
the detection probability increases with the level of deviation from a truthful report at 
a level rate, that is, if managers deviate from a truthful report by no more than 10% 
(20%, 30%, 40%, 50%+),  the corresponding probability of being detected is 10% 
(20%, 30%, 40%, 50%). In the case of an audit team with high effectiveness, the 
detection  probability  doubles  compared  to  that  of  the  audit  team  with  low 
effectiveness. For example, if managers deviate by 1% to 10% from a truthful report, 
there is a 20% probability of being detected; if managers deviate by 10% to 20% from 
a truthful report, there is a 40% probability of being detected; and so on. 
The audit team will then send a message to both the manager and the headquarters 
based on its findings. If its opinion is favorable, the subject receives the following 
message: 
 
"After reviewing your report, I find the costs you reported are fair. This finding 
has been reported to the headquarters.  
                                                                                               The Audit Team" 
 
If the opinion is not favorable, the subject receives the following message: 
 
“Warning: 
After reviewing your report, I find the costs you reported are questionable. This 
finding has been reported to the headquarters.  
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2.3.3 Participants and procedures 
The experiment’s 118 participants are undergraduate or master’s degree students 
that are recruited from an accounting course of a business studies program of a west-
European university. Upon entering the computer lab, the participants are randomly 
assigned to the between-subject factor conditions. Demographic data are reported in 
Table 1. On average, participants are 21.5 years old and have 21 months of (part-time) 








Each subject is randomly assigned a confidential experimental ID when they enter 
the  lab.  This  experimental  ID  is  used  for  cash  payment.  Before  they  start  the 
experimental task, subjects read the general instructions about the experiment. Then 
they provide some personal background information (age, gender, nationality, work 
experience, etc.). Subjects also take a pre-experiment questionnaire, which measures 
their  social  value  orientation  (SVO)  scores.
9 Before  they  continue  their  tasks,  a 
                                                       
9 Our SVO measure is adopted from the psychology and economics literatures (see Van Lange, Otten, 
De Bruin and Joireman 1997). Specifically, social value orientations are measured by having subjects 
  Table 1  
Subject demographics (N=118) 
    N=118  Percentage   
Gender  Male  61  51.69   
   Female  57  48.31   
Age  <20 years  21  17.80   
  20-25 years  92  77.96   
   >25 years  5   4.24   
Nationality  Dutch  70  59.32   
  German  13  11.02   
  Chinese  18  15.25   
   Other  17  14.41   
Work experience  0 month  24  20.34   
  0-12 months  34  28.81   
  12-24 months  28  23.73   
   >24 months  32  27.12   
Accounting experience  No  94  79.66   
   Yes  24  20.34   
Study level  First year BA  10    8.47   
  Second year BA  1   0.85   
  Third year BA  79  66.95   
  Master level  24  20.34   
   Other  4   3.39   22                                          Essays on the Role of Managerial Type in Financial Reporting 
 
hypothetical example is given to help the subjects understand the instructions better 
(see  Appendix  A).  Subjects  also  solve  seven  true  or  false  questions  and  two 
calculation questions based upon the experiment’s instructions. They are not allowed 
to continue unless they answer all questions correctly. The instructor remains in the 
room to answer subjects’ questions.  
Subjects’  cash  payments  are  based  on  a  participation  fee  of  €3  and  the  total 
experimental euros (EEs) earned over all ten periods at the conversion ratio of 500 
EEs to €1. Theoretically, each participant can earn €15 if they lie to the maximum 
extent possible and €9 if they report truthfully. The results show that the average 
payoff  per  participant  is  €10.35.  After  the  experiment,  subjects  complete  a 
questionnaire that examines the effectiveness of the manipulations and the subject’s 




2.4.1 Manipulation checks 
In the exit questionnaire, I determine the effectiveness of the three manipulations by 
measuring subject responses (1 “completely disagree” to 7 “completely agree”) to 
three statements (two in positive and one in negative phrasing). Average responses for 
all three treatments are significantly different from the neutral response of 4 (p<0.001). 
In particular, the subjects agree that their cost report behavior is influenced by (1) the 
incentive  compensation  rate  (mean  response  5.00,  SD=1.71),  (2)  peer  managers’ 
reports (mean response 5.01, SD=1.62), and (3) the effectiveness of the auditing team 
(mean  response  4.86,  SD=1.44).  The  results  indicate  that  all  three  of  the 
manipulations are successful. 
The exit questionnaire also contains five statements that examine the clarity of the 
instructions  and  the  subjects’  motivation.  The  mean  response  on  these  statements 
ranges from 5.21 to 6.02 and is significantly different from the neutral response of 4 
(p<0.001).  The  subjects  therefore  understood  the  experiment  and  in  general  their 
motivation was high.  
                                                                                                                                                        
divide a hypothetical amount of money between themselves and a hypothetical other. Based on their 
choices, subjects can be defined as: (1) a cooperative type, reflecting a preference for joint (collective) 
outcomes, (2) an individualistic type, reflecting a preference for own outcomes, (3) a competitive type, 
reflecting a preference for a large positive difference between own and other outcomes (McClintock, 
1972). Researchers often categorize the individual type and the competitive type as pro-selfs and the 
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2.4.2 Summary statistics for dependent variable 
I measure managerial honesty as a percentage ranging from 0 to 100%, where a 
higher  ratio  indicates  more  honest  reporting.
10  A  higher  ratio  indicates  that 
participants forgo more compensation by reporting a figure closer to the true cost (and 
further from minimum-cost reporting, which would maximize their compensation).  
Following Evans et al. (2001) I perform the analyses on adjusted data by replacing 
a small number of inconsistent reports (25 out of 1180 total reports) with the true 
cost.
11 
Table 2 gives summary statistics for the level of honest reporting under the three 
factor conditions. 
The  results  from  Table  2  show  that  managerial  honesty  is  higher  under  10% 
IncenCompInt (mean = 83.34) than under 50% IncenCompInt (mean = 79.23). Under 
both incentive contracts, subjects seem to conform to what their peers do, that is, they 
are more honest when their peers tend to report truthfully and less honest when their 
peers engage more in underreporting, although the influence of PeerHonst is larger 
under 10% IncenCompInt (78.92 vs. 88.08) than under 50% IncenCompInt (75.49 vs. 
83.24).  With  regard  to  AuditEfftv,  subjects  seem  to  be  more  truthful  with  a  less 
effective audit team. Thus, in contrast to PeerHonst, the influence of AuditEfftv is 
larger  under  50%  IncenCompInt  (82.08  vs.  76.47)  than  under  10%  IncenCompInt 
(84.42 vs. 82.30). 
2.4.3 Tests of hypotheses 
To  facilitate  comparison,  the  analyses  are  based  on  standardized  values  of  the 
honest reporting metric (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). Table 3 
gives the full factorial  ANCOVA analyses with IncenCompInt as  a within-subject 
measure (10% vs. 50%) and PeerHonst and AuditEfftv as between-subject factors. 
                                                       
10 Managerial honesty is defined as 1 (   /    ) 1 1
n n Payoff claimed Payoff available i i π = − ∑ ∑ = = , 
where n is the total number of rounds the subject plays in one setting; the “ Payoff claimed 1
n
i ∑ = ” is 
the amount a subject actually earned across all the experiment’s rounds by deviating from the true costs, 
and the “ Payoff available 1
n
i ∑ = ” is the amount that a subject could have earned by lying to the 
maximum  extent  possible.  In  this  setting,  the  formula  is  equivalent  to 
5 5 1- (true costs-reported costs)/ (true costs-500) 1 1 ∑ ∑ , where 500 is the lowest value the manager can 
report. 
11 These reports are for costs higher than the true costs, which are inconsistent with subjects’ trading off 
wealth and honesty because  they  would  have received a higher payoff by reporting  honestly. The 
analyses are also performed based on unadjusted data. The results do not change regarding the sign and 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics: Mean honest reporting* under three factor conditions 
  IncenCompInt −Low    IncenCompInt −High 
           AuditEfftv            AuditEfftv 
  Low  High  Total    Low  High  Total 
PeerHonst −Low  80.80  77.10  78.92    78.53  72.54  75.49 
  N=30  N=31  N=61    N=30  N=31  N=61 
PeerHonst −High  88.31  87.85  88.08    85.89  80.67  83.24 
  N=28  N=29  N=57    N=28  N=29  N=57 
Total  84.42  82.30  83.34    82.08  76.47  79.23 
  N=58  N=60  N=118    N=58  N=60  N=118 
*Honest Reporting: 1-(true costs-reported costs)/(true costs-500). 
IncenCompInt −Low:  the condition whereby the manager's incentive compensation is 10% of the division's profit. 
IncenCompInt −High: the condition whereby the manager's incentive compensation is 50% of the division's profit. 
PeerHonst −Low:  the condition whereby 10-25% of the peer managers' reports are honest. 
PeerHonst −High:  the condition whereby 75-90% of the peer managers' reports are honest. 
AuditEfftv −High:  the condition whereby high audit team effectiveness is two times as effective as that under low audit team 
effectiveness.        
 
Covariates are gender and the participant’s social value orientation (SVO). The test 
confirms that IncenCompInt is balanced (see manipulations for details), that is, there 
is no order effect (p>0.60).
12 
The  results  from  Table  3  show  that  for  within-subjects  contrast  analyses,  the 
truthfulness of reports is significantly influenced by IncenCompInt (p<0.05). From the 
summary  statistics,  we  know  that  subjects  report  more  truthfully  under  the  10% 
IncenCompInt regime. The results support H1, suggesting that IncenCompInt has a 
negative effect on the truthfulness of reports. Results of between-subjects analyses 
suggest that PeerHonst significantly influences the truthfulness of reports (p<0.05), 
consistent  with  H2.  In  contrast,  AuditEfftv  is  not  found  to  be  a  significant  factor 
influencing the truthfulness of reports, rejecting H3. Besides these main effects, the 
results also suggest the existence of an interactive effect between IncenCompInt and 
PeerHonst (p<0.10), consistent with H4a, suggesting that the effect of PeerHonst on 
the truthfulness of reports is lower when IncenComplnt is high. I find no evidence, 
however, supporting H4b on the interaction between IncenCompInt and AuditEfftv. 
Furthermore,  the  results  reveal  that  SVO  is  a  significant  control  variable  when 
examining managerial reporting behavior (p<0.05), and that IncenCompInt interacts 
with Gender (p<0.00) to influence managerial honesty. To see more clearly the effects 
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of these interactions, figures for selected interactive effects are presented in Panel A 
of Table 4. Panel B of Table 4 presents the ANCOVA results under two incentive 
contract types.   
Figure  1  shows  the  interactive  effect  of  IncenCompInt  and  PeerHonst  on 
managerial  reporting.  PeerHonst  is  more  effective  under  low  IncenCompInt  than 
under high IncenCompInt. Under low IncenCompInt, on average truthful managerial 
reporting is 0.22 above the mean when PeerHonst is high, while on average truthful 
managerial  reporting  is  0.21 below the mean when PeerHonst is low;  under high 
IncenCompInt, on average truthful managerial reporting is 0.16 above the mean when 
PeerHonst is high, while on average truthful managerial reporting is 0.15 below the 
Table 3 
Full factorial analyses    GLM repeated measures 
Dependent variable:  honest reporting (standardized values) 
Within-Subjects Contrasts                                                Between-Subject Contrasts 
           
   SS   F-stat.    SS  F-stat. 
IncenCompInt  0.89  5.66**  PeerHonst  6.94  4.06** 
IncenCompInt * PeerHonst  0.43  2.73*  AuditEfftv  3.82  2.23 
IncenCompInt * AuditEfftv  0.27  1.69  PeerHonst * AuditEfftv  0.17  0.10 
IncenCompInt * PeerHonst * AuditEfftv  0.01  0.08  Gender  0.11  0.07 
IncenCompInt * Gender  2.21  14.05***  SVO  11.06  6.46** 
     
IncenCompInt * SVO  0.12  0.75       
a  Type III sum of squares are reported. All statistical inferences are based on two-tailed tests.  
*: Significant at 10% level. **: Significant at 5% level. ***: Significant at 1% level. 
Honest reporting: 1- (true costs - reported costs)/(true costs - 500). 
IncenCompInt: the condition whereby the manager's incentive compensation is either 10% or 50% of his division's profit. 
PeerHonst:  equals one if 75-90% of the peer managers' reports are honest, zero if 15-25% of the peer managers’ reports are honest. 
AuditEfftv: equals one if the audit team is highly effective, zero if it is less effective, where a highly effective audit team is two times 
as effective as a less effective audit team. For details, see the text for manipulations. 
Gender: equals one if the subject is male, zero otherwise. 
SVO: equals one if the subject is classified as pro-self, zero if the subject is classified as pro-social.  26                                          Essays on the Role of Managerial Type in Financial Reporting 
 
mean when PeerHonst is low. Consistent with this result, Panel B shows that under 
low IncenCompInt, PeerHonst influences managerial reporting behavior significantly 
Table 4 
Panel A: Interactive effects on honest reporting (based on standardized values) 
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at p<0.05; under high IncenCompInt, PeerHonst no longer shows significant influence.  
Figure 2 shows the interactive effect between IncenCompInt and AuditEfftv. The 
effect of AuditEfftv on the truthfulness of reporting is not significant in the regression 
analysis.  The  interactive  effect  between  IncenCompInt  and  AuditEfftv  is  also 
negligible but it seems that AuditEfftv has a larger effect under high IncenCompInt: 
honest reporting is 0.05 above (below) the mean when AuditEfftv is low (high) under 
low IncenCompInt, whereas under high IncenCompInt, honest reporting is 0.13 above 
(below) the mean when AuditEfftv is low (high). Univariate analyses from Panel B 
show that AuditEfftv’s influence is negligible under low IncenCompInt and marginally 
significant at p<0.10 under high IncenCompInt. 
Figure 3 shows the interactive effect of IncenCompInt and SVO. Consistent with 
theory,  SVO  is  constant  across  the  two  levels  of  IncenCompInt.  However,  when 
Panel B: Univariate analysis under different incentive contract type* 
Dependent Variable: honest reporting with 10% IncenCompInt 
  SS 
b  df  F  Sig. 
Corrected Model  12.74  5  2.74  0.02 
PeerHonst  5.42  1  5.82  0.02 
AuditEfftv  1.03  1  1.11  0.29 
PeerHonst * AuditEfftv  0.14  1  0.15  0.70 
Gender  1.66  1  1.78  0.19 
SVO  4.45  1  4.78  0.03 
Dependent Variable: honest reporting with 50% IncenCompInt 
  SS  df  F  Sig. 
Corrected Model    11.82    5    3.13    0.03  
PeerHonst   1.96    1    2.09    0.15  
AuditEfftv   3.05    1    3.24    0.07  
PeerHonst * AuditEfftv   0.04    1    0.05    0.83  
Gender   0.67    1    0.71    0.40  
SVO   6.73    1    7.17    0.01  
a  All intercepts are significant but not reported.  
b  Type III sum of squares. 
Honest reporting: 1- (true costs - reported costs)/(true costs - 500). 
IncenCompInt: the condition whereby the manager's incentive compensation is either 10% or 50% of his division's profit. 
PeerHonst:  equals one if 75-90% of the peer managers' reports are honest, zero if 15-25% of the peer managers’ reports are honest. 
AuditEfftv: equals one if the audit team is highly effective, zero if it is less effective, where the highly effective audit team is  
two times as effective as the less effective audit team. For details, see the text for manipulations. 
Gender: equals one if the subject is male, zero otherwise. 
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subjects are classified as pro-socials, the truthfulness of their reports is 0.32 higher 
than the mean; whereas when subjects are classified as pro-selves, the truthfulness of 
their reports is 0.14 lower than the mean. Panel B further suggests that, as a personal 
trait measure, SVO is significant in both regressions.  
Figure 4 presents the interactive effects between IncenCompInt and Gender. The 
figure reveals that there is a significant difference in reporting behavior between male 
and female subjects regarding the influence of IncenCompInt. When IncenCompInt is 
switched from low to high, male subjects report dramatically less honestly, moving 
from  0.11  above  the  mean  to  0.07  below  the  mean,  but  female  subjects  report 
considerably more honestly, moving from 0.12 below the mean to 0.08 above the 
mean.  Although  the  ANCOVA  analysis  of  Panel  B  shows  that  Gender  has  no 
significant effect under either high or low IncenCompInt, there is a directional change 
from less to more honest reporting of female subjects and from more to less honest 
reporting of male subjects when IncenCompInt is switched from low to high.  
2.4.4 Sensitivity analyses 
In this sub-section I first perform additional analyses on the effect of AuditEfftv; I 
then  perform  sensitivity analyses  to  verify  the  robustness  of  the  main  tests’  other 
results.  
   
The  effect  of  AuditEfftv  on  sub-samples:  The  effect  of  AuditEfftv  on  managerial 
honesty is negligible in all tests. This result is not consistent with my hypothesis, nor 
is it consistent with the results of the manipulation checks that indicate, on average, 
participants agree that audit team effectiveness influences their reporting decisions. 
To explore this inconsistency, I divide the participants into two groups according to 
their  honesty  level  and  perform  the  analysis  separately  on  the  sub-samples.  In 
particular, participants are divided into two sub-samples according to whether they 
made an honest report above or below the mean in the first or the second round. 
Participants  who  make  an  honest  report  above  the  mean  are  defined  as  honest 
participants and those  who make an honest report below the mean are defined as 
dishonest participants. Figures for the analysis are presented in Table 5.  
Figure  1  shows  the  reporting  behavior  of  honest  participants  in  the  low  audit 
effectiveness  setting.  The  participants  show  a  downward  trend  in  making  honest 
reports until the last round. Figure 2 shows that, in high audit effectiveness setting, the 
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round, and then show an increasing trend in honest reports through the last round. 
This  pattern  is  consistent  with  these  participants feeling  embarrassed  after  getting 
caught and then becoming very cautious about their reporting behavior. The different 
behavioral patterns of the honest participants in these two audit effectiveness settings 
are driven by the difference in detection probabilities. From Figure 3 and Figure 4, we 
can  see  that  the  dishonest  participants  show  a  relatively  flat  trend  regarding  their 
reporting figures in both high and low audit effectiveness settings. It therefore seems 
that audit effectiveness works only partly for some participants. On average it does 
not display any significant effects.  
 
Alternative measure for managerial honesty: The analysis is repeated based on a 
frequency measure defined as the number of rounds in which the subject revealed the 
Table 5 
The effect of audit effectiveness on sub-samples 
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true  cost  out  of  the  total  number  of  experimental  rounds  for  each  treatment  (five 
rounds each for the two level of IncenCompInt). The full factorial ANCOVA repeated 
measure  results  are  the  same  as  those  reported  in  Tables  3  and  4,  although  the 
interaction between IncenCompInt and PeerHonst becomes somewhat weaker.  
 
Results based on sub-sample without outliers: Three out of 118 participants lied to 
the  maximum  extent  possible  in  all  experimental  rounds.  All  of  these  subjects 
correspond  to  the  high  AuditEfftv  condition.  I  therefore  perform  detection  tests  to 
determine whether these three observations can be labeled as outliers;
13 the results 
indicate that, indeed, these observations are outliers. I then re-perform the analyses 
based on the sample without these outliers (results not tabulated). The results from the 
full  factorial  ANCOVA  analysis  remain  materially  the  same  in  terms  of  both 
coefficient magnitude and significance level. The results from the univariate analysis 
also remain the same. 
 
Additional  control  variables:    I  repeat  the  tests  adding  work  experience  and 
accounting experience as extra control variables. The results remain the same and 
both work experience and accounting experience show positive effects on managerial 
honesty,  which  may  indicate  that  subjects  with  (accounting)  work  experience  are 
more cautious when making financial reports.  
 
Results based on four rounds of data: Data from the final experimental round may 
not  be  reliable  since  previous  experiments  show  that  there  is  “end-round”  effect 
(subjects behave quite differently in the last experimental round) (Hannan et al. 2006). 
The results based on four rounds of data are largely consistent with the results from 
the analysis of five rounds of data (results not tabulated). 
 
Validity of the honesty measure: it is maybe a concern that the honesty measure 
could be measuring how well these participants understand the experiment. If it is true, 
we will be induced to believe that some fraction of the subjects sees  through the 
                                                       
13 A test heuristic suggests that an observation with a z-score greater than three should be labeled as an 
outlier.  In  a  more  reliable  test,  a  modified  z-score  test  is  determined  based  on  outlier-resistant 
estimators. The median absolute deviation about the median (MAD) is such an estimator. The test 
heuristic indicates that an observation with a modified z-score greater than three and a half should be 
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experiment and lie to the maximum; those who do not understand the experiment are 
honest, but had they understood what was going on, would have lied to the maximum 
as well. To  rule out these possibilities,  I perform the following tests: 1)  I run an 
association test between the honesty measure and several self-reported scores on how 
well the participants understand the experiment; 2) I run an association test between 
the honesty measure and the time the participants used to solve the quiz about the 
experiment before they run the formal experiment. I collect data on how well the 
participants understand the experiment with three questions (see question 1, 4, and 6 
in Appendix B for details). I run association tests between the honesty measure and 
scores for each of these three questions as well as the average score of these questions. 
The results show that there is no significant relationship between the honesty measure 
and scores of how well they understand the experiment (p values range from 0.19 to 
0.97).  The results also show that there is no  significant  relationship  between the 
honesty measure and the time the participants spent on solving the quiz regarding the 
experiment (p value equals 0.85). In sum, the results show that the honesty level of 
these participants is not related with their understanding of the experiment.  
Overall, the sensitivity checks show that the evidence relating to H1, H2, and H4A 
is  quite  robust.  Furthermore,  SVO  and  gender  continue  to  be  significant  control 
variables  for  reporting  behavior.  AuditEfftv,  in  contrast,  generally  does  not  affect 
reporting  behavior,  although  there  is  some  evidence  that  it  might  help  promote 
honesty among individuals who dislike being found out after underreporting.  
 
2.5 Discussion and conclusion 
This paper provides experimental evidence on how incentive compensation, peer-
group behavior, and audit effectiveness influence managerial reporting behavior. The 
results show first that high incentive compensation intensity induces subjects to report 
less  truthfully,  consistent  with  Bergstresser  and  Philippon’s  (2006)  findings  that 
highly “incentivized” CEOs tend to manipulate reported earnings more. Next, high 
peer honesty is found to promote truthful managerial reporting, which suggests that 
peer  honesty  is  potentially  a  valuable  tool  to  promote  more  truthful  reporting. 
However, the magnitude of honest reporting is influenced more significantly by peer 
behavior  when  incentive  compensation  intensity  is  low,  that  is,  under  incentive-
intensive contracts, the cost of making truthful reports increases and thus managers 
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managers trade off behavioral (non-monetary) and economic factors in making their 
reporting decisions, and is consistent with Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman (1997), 
who argue that the level of honesty declines as the payoff to lying increases. Finally, 
the results show no conclusive evidence regarding the effect of audit effectiveness on 
managerial reporting behavior.  
Turning  attention  to  our  controls,  the  tests  indicate  that  one’s  social  value 
orientation (SVO) and gender are both important control variables in the context of 
managerial  reporting  behavior.  Pro-self  managers,  as  classified  according  to  SVO 
scores,  always  report  less  truthfully  compared  with  pro-social  managers.  An 
interesting interaction between incentive compensation and gender shows that female 
managers  report  more  truthfully  under  high  incentive  compensation  intensity 
compared with low incentive compensation intensity, while their male peers do the 
opposite. Previous research has revealed some evidence that women are more likely 
than men to be pro-social, but the evidence is not consistent (for a review, see Van 
Lange, Liebrand, Messick, and Wilke 1992; Komorita and Parks 1994). In this paper, 
the  correlation  between  SVO  and  gender  is  -0.13,  but  not  statistically  significant 
(p=0.18), which shows there is no relation between SVO and gender. The interaction 
effect  between  incentive  compensation  intensity  and  gender  is  consistent  with 
previous  research  that  many  people  do  not  behave  in  a  self-interest  maximizing 
manner  due  to  their  perception  of  fairness  (see,  e.g.,  Guth,  Schmittberger,  and 
Schmittberger 1982; Camerer and Thaler 1995; Kagel and Roth 1995) and women are 
more sensitive to social context than are men (Croson and Gneezy 2004) . In this 
experiment, women may perceive 50% incentive scheme as fair and consider honest 
behavior as more appropriate. Men care more about the cost of being honest; they are 
less honest under 50% incentive scheme because it is more costly to be honest given 
that the pay-off for lying is higher.  
The  results  above  suggest  a  need  to  carefully  consider  the  effect  of  incentive 
compensation,  peer  behavior,  and  the  role  of  auditing  when  designing  contracts. 
Incentive compensation, while it has been shown to be effective in aligning interests 
of managers and firms, also appears to have dark side. With respect to peer behavior, 
peers can have a positive effect if they behave in a desired direction or a negative 
effect if they behave in an undesired direction. This result highlights the possibility of 
using  peer  groups  as  an  alternative  mechanism  to  promote  honesty  in  managerial 
reporting.  Turning  to  audit  effectiveness,  the  results  suggest  that  absent  a  penalty Chapter 2   Can Firms Promote Honest Reporting Behavior by Managers?               33 
 
upon the detection misreporting, audit effectiveness does little to promoting truthful 
reporting.  
By integrating the insights from both economics and the behavioral sciences into 
accounting theories, this paper adds to our knowledge on how managers balance their 
monetary and non-monetary  considerations when deciding on the honesty of their 
reports. However, much is still unknown about the influence of peer behavior. One 
important avenue for future research is to explore this issue further. For example, do 
managers react differently to peers’ influence when there is a penalty attached with 
formal governance?  
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2.7 Appendix A. Overview of an experimental period 
 
 At the beginning of each period, the headquarters of the corporation proposes a contract 
about  your  compensation.  You  have  the  following  investment  project:  the  costs  of  this 
project range from 500 to 2500. This is the only information the headquarters knows. As 
a manager, you know the exact costs of the project. Both you and the headquarters observe 
the output value of the project. After completing the project, you need to report the costs of 
the project to the headquarters. Then both your payoff and your division's contribution to firm 
profit can be calculated.  




   
 
The headquarters     The project                     The output                 You decide                    You are paid                                      
proposes                   is completed                   value                         which costs                    according to                                                                                                                                               
your compensation                                          is known                    to report                the compensation                                                                                            
contract                                                                                                                                           contract 
      
 
Hypothetical Example (Please read the following example very carefully): 
Please note that this example is only a description of possible actions in an experimental 
period and should not be construed to be the "best" set of actions possible. 
 
[Action 1]  
At the beginning of each period, headquarters propose a contract about your compensation. 
Suppose the contract is the following: 
Your payoff = Compensation rate *(output value - reported costs)      
Suppose the compensation rate is 10%. 
The division's contribution to firm profit is that the project's payoff subtracts your payoff.  
That is:  
Your division's contribution to firm profit = Project's payoff -Your payoff 
 
[Action 2]  
The project is completed.  
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[Action 3]  
Both you and the headquarters know the output value. Only you know the real costs. Suppose 
the output value is 3000 EEs.  
 
[Action 4]  
You decide which costs to report. Suppose you know that the exact costs are 2000 EEs. The 
headquarters only knows that the costs could range in any value between 500 EEs and 2500 
EEs with equal probability. Following shows the effects of your report decision on your 
payoff and your division's contribution to firm's profit. 
If you report that the costs are 2500 EEs,  
Your payoff = 10% * (3000-2500) = 50 EEs  
Division's contribution to firm = 1000-50 =950 EEs 
If you report that the costs are 2000 EEs, 
Your payoff = 10% * (3000-2000) = 100 EEs 
Division's contribution to firm= 1000-100 =900 EEs 
If you report that the costs are 1500 EEs, 
Your payoff = 10% * (3000-1500) = 150 EEs 
Division's contribution to firm= 1000-150 = 850 EEs 
To summarize, both your payoff and your division’s contribution to firm profit will be 
influenced by your reported costs. If you reported lower costs than real, your division’s 
contribution to the firm will be lower.  
 
[Action 5] 
Based on your reported cost, you will be paid according to your compensation contract.  
    
[Peer Group]  
In a very similar setting, some managers performed the same tasks as you do here, e.g., they 
had the same projects as you; they knew the exact costs, but headquarters didn't; they also 
submit the cost report to the headquarters.  
In  each  experimental  period,  you  will  be  provided  information  about  the  average 
reporting decision.  
 
[Audit Team] 
Since the headquarters don't know the exact costs, in each experimental period an audit team 
will be sent to your division to investigate your reported costs. The headquarters will also 
determine whether the firm: 
•  has at least one financial expert serving on its audit team; or  42                                          Essays on the Role of Managerial Type in Financial Reporting 
 
•  does not have a financial expert serving on its audit team.   
 
The audit team has some knowledge about the true costs of the project. It will give an opinion 
about your reported costs. Then  the  audit  team  will  send  a  message*  to  you  and  the 
headquarters based on its findings.  
 
*If its opinion is favorable, you will receive the following message: 
"After reviewing your report, we find the cost you reported is fair. This finding has been 
reported to the headquarters.  
                                                                                   The Audit Team" 
                    
 
If its opinion is not favorable, you will receive the following message: 
Warning: 
After reviewing your report, we find the cost you reported is questionable. This finding has 
been reported to the headquarters.  
                                                                                   The Audit Team" 
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2.8 Appendix B. Exit questionnaire 
 
You will receive 20 questions in relation to the experiment.  
 
Each question has a 1 to 7 answering scale. Fill in the number that applies best to you.   
1              2               3                  4                 5                     6                 7 
    
 
Completely                                                 Neither agree                                                               Completely 
disagree                                                      nor disagree                                                                    agree 
 
1. The instructions were clearly formulated. 
2. I was motivated to perform well in the different parts of the experiment. 
3. I felt stressed with respect to time. 
4. I understood what I had to do in the experiment. 
5. I thought the tasks were fun. 
6. I clearly knew the consequence of my choice. 
7. When I prepared my own cost report, I considered what other managers reported. 
8. I felt pressure when the audit team said my report was questionable. 
9. When I made my reporting decision, the compensation rate was an important factor 
to consider. 
10. Other managers' decisions influenced my decision. 
11. The compensation rate affected my cost reporting choice. 
12. The audit team influenced my reporting decision. 
13. I didn't care about the compensation rate when I made my cost reporting decisions. 
14. I didn't care what the audit team said. 
15. I didn't care what the other mangers reported. 
16. Reporting lower than real costs would be unfair to the firm. 
17. I felt guilty when I reported a lower cost than real. 
18. I didn't care how much the headquarters received. 
19. I didn't feel ashamed when I deviated from the true cost. 
20. I felt guilty when I was caught by the audit team. 
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2.9 Appendix C. Measure of social value orientation 
 
In  this  short  questionnaire  we  ask  you  to  make  a  number  of  choices.  You  make 
choices by means of circling letters A, B, or C. Your choices determine the number of 
points that you and somebody else receive. Assume that this other person also makes 
choices in exactly the same task. 
 
Who is this other person? 
Assume that the other person is somebody that you do not know (have never met) and 
that you will never meet this person in the future. The other person is completely 
unknown to you. 
 
What do points mean? 
Points represent the things you value. Assume that every point is valuable to you. The 
more points you get the better for you. The same is true for the other person: the more 
points he or she gets, the better for him or her. 
 
An example: 
                                      A                                    B                                    C 
You get                         500                                500                                 550 
Other person gets         100                                500                                 300 
 
This example works as follows. If you choose A, you will get 500 points, and the 
other person will get 100 points; if you choose B you will get 500 points and the other 
person will get 500 points; if you choose C you will get 550 points and the other 
person gets 300 points. 
 
After  this  introduction, nine  tables  closely  resembling  the  one  in  the  example  are 
presented  to  the  participants.  Each  table  has  three  allocations,  cooperative, 
individualist, and competitive, always in this order. Participants choose one of the 
following three matrix values according to his/her preference. Finally, his/her score 
will  be  calculated  and  he/she  classified  into  pro-social  (cooperative)  or  pro-self 
(individualist and competitive) types based on the scores.  






























  A  B  C 
  [You,   Other] [You,   Other] [You,   Other] 
1  [480,   480]  [540,   280]  [480,    80 ] 
2  [500,   500]  [560,   300]  [500,   100] 
3  [520,   520]  [580,   320]  [520,   120] 
4  [490,   490]  [560,   300]  [500,   100] 
5  [500,   500]  [560,   300]  [490,    90 ] 
6  [500,   500]  [570,   300]  [500,   100] 
7  [510,   510]  [560,   300]  [510,   110] 
8  [500,   500]  [550,   300]  [500,   100] 
9  [490,   490]  [540,   300]  [480,   100] 
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  We explore the earnings properties of firms that have backdated stock options 
granted to executives in an effort to determine to what extent accounting earnings are 
shaped by personal traits of the top level managers of the firm. Our investigation is 
motivated by an increasing awareness in the extant literature that substantial variation 
in firm reporting practices remains after controlling for fundamental factors that work 
at the industry or the firm level (Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam 2008; Francis, 
Huang, Rajgopal, and Zhang 2008). Managerial characteristics are a probable source 
of  this  heterogeneity  among  firms  (Bertrand  and  Schoar  2003).  Research  on  the 
reporting effects of these characteristics has been stymied by the absence of reliable 
proxies that can be implemented in large sample studies. We propose that the context 
of  the  option  backdating  scandal  provides  a  powerful  setting  that  allows  us  to 
dichotomize the population of senior executives into those who have been identified 
as willing to engage in (likely) illegal activities and into those who have not. A priori, 
a manager’s willingness to commit fraudulent acts should reveal personality traits that 
also  affect  the  way  in  which  managers  exercise  their  discretion  over  financial 
reporting.  Thus,  in  a  way  we  circumvent  the  problem  of  measuring  executive 
characteristics  by  examining  a  setting  in  which  we  can  identify  those  executives 
whose (ethical) propensities have put them into the extreme tail of the distribution of a 
very specific personality trait, which we shorthand as “honesty”.  
Employee stock options (ESO) are usually granted “at-the-money”, i.e., the 
exercise price of the option is set equal to the market price of the underlying stock on 
the  grant  date.  As  the  option  value  is  higher  when  the  exercise  price  is  lower, 
managers prefer to be granted options when the stock price is at its lowest. Prior to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, firms were not required to report the dates of the option 
grant until 45 days after the fiscal year end. This gave managers the opportunity to
                                                       
* Based on a paper co-authored with Peter D. Easton (University of Notre Dame) and Laurence van 
Lent (Tilburg University). 
†Yuping Jia’s research is supported by a grant (no. 017.001.101) from the Netherlands Organization for 
Scientific  Research  (NWO).  We  received  helpful  feedback  from  workshop  participants  at  Tilburg 
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“choose”  a  past  date  when  the  market  price  was  particularly  low;  in  short, 
managers were able to “backdate” the ESO.
 16  New SEC regulation announced in 
2002 requires firms to report options grants within two business days, which reduces 
the possibility to backdate, but does not eliminate it altogether.
17                                                                                                                                                                          
After The Wall Street Journal picked up on a study by Eric Lie (2005), option 
backdating has continued to feature on the front pages, implicating a widening group 
of companies of involvement in the scandal.
18 At the same time, the Securities and 
Exchange  Commission  as  well  as  state  and  federal  prosecutors  have  launched 
investigations into possible improper backdating of options and over 130 listed firms 
were incriminated by the summer of 2007. Consequently, more than 50 top executives 
and  directors  of  named  companies  resigned  or  were  fired.  Backdating  has  also 
attracted significant attention from the academic community and substantial work has 
been done to investigate its economic consequences.
19 We only indirectly add to this 
area as our interest is not in option backdating itself, but instead in the impact of top 
executive personality traits on the properties of accounting information reported by 
the firm.  
  Our  main  prediction  is  that—compared  with  non-backdating  executives—
those managers who have revealed their type by engaging in option backdating, are 
also more likely to use their discretion over reported accounting information in such 
way that its quality deteriorates. We test this prediction by examining seven earnings 
attributes:  accrual  quality,  persistence,  predictability,  smoothness,  value  relevance, 
timeliness,  and  conservatism(Francis,  LaFond,  Olsson,  and  Schipper  2004).  These 
attributes are generally understood as (overlapping) measures of accounting quality 
(Verdi 2005). 
Using a sample of 72 identified backdating firms (314 firm-year observations) 
and  5760  non-backdating  firms  (34,476  firm-year  observations),  we  show  that 
backdating firms have lower accrual quality, less smoothed earnings, and report less 
                                                       
16 Section 403 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires companies to report their option grant “before the 
end of second business day.”  
17 Note that backdating need not be illegal. As Eric Lie points out on his website, however, if firms 
comply  with  the  requirements  under  which  backdating  is  legal,  there  would  be  little  advantage 
associated  with  backdating.  Lie  concludes  that  backdating  is  illegal  in  most  cases.  (See: 
http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/backdating.htm).  
18 See: Johnston (2004), Maremont (2005), Forelle and Bandler (2006b; 2006a).  
19 See:  Lie  (2005),  Lie  and  Heron  (2006),  Bernile,  Jarell, and  Mulcahey  (2006),  Fleischer  (2006), 
Narayanan, Schipani, Seyhun (2006), Walker (2006), Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2007), Cicero 
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timely.  The  same  group  of  firms,  however,  also  shows  more  predictable,  more 
conservative, and more persistent earnings. These results hold after controlling for 
“innate”  determinants  of  earnings  attributes,  i.e.,  fundamental,  non-discretionary, 
economic factors that affect the financial reporting of the firm (Francis et al. 2004). 
Controlling for innate factors is especially important in this case, as Lie (2005) reports 
that backdating is concentrated in small firms, technology stocks, and firms with high 
stock  price  volatility.  We  do  not  find  significant  differences  in  value  relevance 
between  the  two  groups  of  firms.  To  the  extent  that  we  successfully  control  for 
“innate” differences between backdating and non-backdating firms, we document a 
significant impact of top executive traits on six out of seven earnings attributes. 
We  interpret  these  findings  in  the  light  of  recent  concerns  voiced  in  the 
literature that contend that these earnings attributes may not in fact be unambiguous 
measures of accounting quality (Verdi 2005; Barton, Hansen, and Pownall 2007).
20 
Indeed, to some extent managers may have to sacrifice “accrual quality” to improve 
“persistence”  or  “predictability”.    In  the  context  of  our  setting,  three  earnings 
attributes signal that the backdating firms have higher accounting quality than their 
peers; three attributes suggests the opposite. With an eye towards this ambiguity, we 
ask whether individual investors can use information from the firm’s annual report to 
obtain a clearer signal of accounting quality than provided by earnings attributes. 
Accounting ratios have been a staple of financial statement analysis textbooks 
for years. We compute (line-item-based) ratios that are suggested as diagnostic tests 
of accounting problems in most textbooks (see, e.g., Penman (2007)).  In matched 
sample tests, we compare ratios based on sales, expenses, profit margin, and asset 
turnover between backdating and matched sample firms and report results that are 
consistent with backdating firms delaying expenses and aggressively booking sales. 
These results can be interpreted as further evidence on our main research question 
about  the  influence  of  individual  top  executives  on  the  properties  of  accounting 
information. In contrast to the tests based on earnings attributes, accounting ratios 
consistently  show  that  the  financial  statements  of  backdating  firms  are  of  lower 
quality than those of their peers.  
We subject our results to several sensitivity checks and show that the findings 
                                                       
20 In fact, Francis et al. (2004) show that achieving improvements on some accounting quality measures 
are  more  associated  with  (cost-of  capital)  benefits  than  others.  In  their  case,  timeliness  and 
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are robust to different econometric specifications and alternative research designs.  
As  in  the  handful  of  previous  studies  on  the  impact  of  top  executive 
characteristics on accounting choices made in firms, we show that executive traits are 
an important determinant. At the same time, our results are, prima facie, not easy to 
reconcile with those in Francis et al. (2008) who conclude that reputable CEOs are 
present  more  in  firms  with  low  earnings  quality.  The  after  the  fact  reputation  of 
managers of backdating firms is clearly poor. But one would be well-advised to guard 
against retrospectively applying this reputation to the time period when the firm had 
not yet been accused of illegal actions. Nevertheless, Francis et al. (2008) argue that 
more talented managers are matched with firms with poor earnings quality (as these 
stand to benefit more from talent). Malmendier and Tate (2007) show that reputable 
“superstar”  CEOs  engage  in  more  earnings  management  after  winning  prestigious 
awards from the business press. Their interpretation is, however, less optimistic as 
they attribute the increased earnings management to attempts of the CEO to uphold 
his or her favorable press coverage. Our results suggests at least two conclusions vis-
à-vis this earlier work. First, the (press-) reputation of managers may still be a noisy 
proxy of those managerial traits that matter when making reporting choices. Second, 
given  the  ambiguous  signals  about  earnings  quality  provided  by  many  of  the 
conventional quality measures in the accounting literature, care must be exercised 
when forming conclusions on the basis of these proxies. Indeed, our results suggest 
that  looking  at  ratios  based  on  line-item  financial  statement  data  might  yield  less 
equivocal interpretations. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis development 
3.2.1  Review  of  the  literature  on  the  effect  of  executive  traits  on  accounting 
choices 
  Existing  theories  of  accounting  choice  focus  on economic  fundamentals  to 
explain the variation across firms in financial reporting practices (Fields, Lys, and 
Vincent 2001). While this body of work has significantly improved our understanding 
of how contractual and regulatory forces shape accounting properties, it is generally 
recognized that firms with similar fundamentals make substantially different reporting 
choices. This begs the question what has been overlooked in extant work. Recently, a 
handful  of  studies  have  suggested  to  address  this  question  by  exploring  how 
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(Malmendier and Tate 2007; Francis et al. 2008). Specifically, controlling for other 
fundamental  forces,  do  the  personality  traits  of  a  manager  matter  with  regard  to 
accounting  properties?  Researchers  in  finance,  management,  and  economics  have 
already documented that differences in type of executive can influence operational, 
financing,  and  many  other  decisions  in  the  firm  (Hambrick  and  Mason  1984; 
Rotemberg  and  Saloner  2000;  Bertrand  and  Schoar  2003;  Richardson,  Tuna,  and 
Wysocki 2003; Scherr and Jensen 2006; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2007).  One 
barrier  to  this  type  of  work  is  to  identify  what  personality  trait  of  managers  is 
important with regard to explaining accounting choices. When identified, the next 
question is equally thorny: what proxy can be used to facilitate large sample studies 
on  the  accounting  effects  of  managerial  traits?  Both  Francis  et  al.  (2008)  and 
Malmendier  and  Tate  (2007)  rely  on  press  coverage  as  a  measure  of  managerial 
reputation. Francis et al. (2008) essentially argue that more talented managers (who 
have a stronger reputation) are more valuable in firms with poor earnings quality and 
tend to be hired by these firms. Malmendier and Tate (2007) report that the earnings 
quality of firms deteriorates after a CEO becomes a superstar, which also yields a 
negative  association  between  reputation  and  earnings  quality,  but  in  their 
interpretation this happens because the behavior of a talented manager changes to the 
disadvantage of the firm after achieving superstar status. These studies are important 
first  steps  in  understanding  the  relation  between  executive  traits  and  accounting 
choices.  
We  take  a  different  approach  and  argue  that  when  managers  engage  in 
backdating, they reveal a personality trait that suggests that they are willing to mislead 
shareholders,  tax  authorities  and  other  stakeholders  to  the  firm  to  obtain  personal 
benefits. Earlier experimental studies have suggested that this personality trait spills-
over to reporting decisions (Harrell and Harrison 1994; Booth and Schulz 2004). Thus, 
we  expect  that  backdating  executives  have  few  scruples  to  reduce  the  quality  of 
accounting earnings if this helps them to achieve some personal gain. On average, 
therefore, we expect the earnings quality of backdating firms to be lower than that of 
their  peers,  controlling  for  other  fundamental  determinants  of  earnings  attributes. 
More formally, 
: 1 H   Firms  that  have  engaged  in  option  backdating  have  lower  earnings 
quality than firms that have not backdated their options. 
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3.2.2 Earnings attributes as measures of earnings quality 
 Francis  et  al.  (2004)  synthesize  much  of  the  empirical  research  on  the 
properties of accounting earnings into seven desirable “earnings attributes”, each of 
which captures some dimension of the uncertainty about the future free cash flows to 
common equity. We discuss these attributes here whereas their detailed computation 
is described in Appendix 1. Francis et al. distinguish two groups: accounting-based 
and  market-based  attributes.  Accrual  quality,  persistence,  predictability,  and 
smoothness are measured using financial statement information only, and hence are 
accounting-based. Value-relevance, timeliness, and conservatism are measured using 
earnings-return  regressions  and  therefore  are  market-based.  Francis  et  al.  also 
differentiate between “discretionary” and “innate” components of each attribute since 
earnings properties are determined by both innate, fundamental economic forces of 
the  firm’s  contracting  and  operating  environment  as  well  as  by  discretionary, 
managerial decisions. This distinction is especially important in our setting as we 
believe that the most direct evidence of the impact of executive traits on earnings 
quality will be found in the discretionary attributes (see also, Francis et al. (2008)).  
Although Francis et al. recognize that some significant correlations between 
earnings attributes exist, they also conclude that the attributes are distinct (and overlap 
each other only to a limited extent). In contrast, some recent papers use principal 
components  analysis  to  aggregate  the  attributes  into  one-dimensional  constructs. 
Verdi  (2005)  reports  that  accruals  quality,  earnings  smoothness,  and  earnings 
predictability  together  proxy  for  the  information  available  about  a  firm,  whereas 
value-relevance  and  timeliness  capture  the  relation  between  stock  returns  and 
accounting  information.
21 In  a  similar  effort,  Barton  et  al.  (2007)  derive  three 
principal components: persistence, predictability and smoothness are grouped together 
as a measure of “sustainability”, whereas timeliness and conservatism each are treated 
as a separate factor capturing “representational faithfulness” and “bias”, respectively. 
One implication of these analyses is that earnings attributes are not distinct, but in fact 
capture the same underlying construct. In also turns out that investors do not seem to 
care equally about each of the attributes (Barton et al. 2007). Francis et al. (2004) and 
Verdi (2005) report that accounting-based attributes are associated with greater cost-
of-capital effects than market based attributes. Barton et al. (2007) document that  
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persistence and timeliness are valued more by investors. Taken together, it seems that 
accounting-based attributes are associated with the greatest benefits for the firm.  
Lowering the quality of those attributes that are valued by investors is more 
costly to managers, both in personal terms and by potentially attracting scrutiny from 
shareholders. Indeed, if firm value is affected by low accounting quality, then the 
personal  wealth  of  managers  will  be  affected  as  well  through  their  equity 
compensation.  Thus,  executives  may  choose  not  to  lower  the  quality  across  all 
dimensions to the same extent. Based on the findings of prior work, we expect that the 
cost of reducing quality of accounting-based attributes is higher and the difference in 
accounting  quality  between  backdating  and  non-backdating  firms  will  be  less 
pronounced for these attributes.  
  : 2 H   The  difference  in  accounting  quality  between  firms  that  have 
engaged in option backdating and those that have not is smaller 
for accounting-based earnings attributes than for market-based 
earnings attributes.  
 
3.3 Sample and descriptive statistics 
  We use a list of companies that have disclosed government probes, misdated 
options,  restatements,  and/or  executive  departures  provided  by  The  Wall  Street 
Journal Online as our source for firms that are under scrutiny for possible option 
backdating.
22 Our sample time period is from 1991 to 2005.
23 We verify when the 
company is suspected to have first backdated options as well the time period over 
which backdating (allegedly) occurred. This yields a sample of 72 backdating firms 
(314 firm-year observations). We verify whether the investigation period is equal to a 
CEO’s tenure. Appendix 2 lists the firms included in the sample as well as the time 
period in which they have engaged in backdating.  
    We use financial data from the Compustat Annual Industrial and Research 
files  and  market  data  from  the  CRSP  files.  Table  1  presents  the  number  of 
observations by year with available data to compute each of the earnings attributes as 
                                                       
22 http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html.  We  used  the  data 
available in August 2007.  
23  WSJ  online  reports  backdating  for  10  firm-year  observations  before  1991.  These  firm-year 
observations do not survive our data requirement filters or are removed when we exclude outliers. To 
increase the power of our tests, we decide against a sample period that starts from the first recorded 
backdating in 1981. Nevertheless, when we extend our sample period back to 1981, all of our results 
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defined by Francis et al. (2004). Panel A presents the observations used in the tests. 
The estimation of earnings attributes described in Francis (2004) involves time-series 
regressions using rolling firm-specific 10-year windows. In addition, to ensure that 
comparisons between attributes are not driven by differences in samples, Francis et al. 
(2004) require firms to have data available for all seven attributes for all firm-years. 
We relax these strict sample selection criteria somewhat to increase the number of 
backdating firms in our sample. Specifically, we use rolling firm- specific 6-year 
windows (t-5, …, t). Thus, as we start our sample in 1991, we obtain data from 1986 




This table presents the year-by-year distribution of backdating and non-backdating 
firms included in the final sample for the main tests (Panel A) and the full sample 
(Panel B). To be included in the final sample, firms need to have data available for 
the calculation of all seven earnings attributes as defined in Appendix 1. The full 
sample contains firms with data available to compute at least one of the seven 
earnings attributes in any given year. The sample period is from 1991 to 2005.  
 
 
Panel A: Final Sample Used in the Tests  Panel B: Full Sample 
Year  # Firms  # Backdating firms  Total  Year  # Firms  # Backdating firms  Total 
1991  1999  1  2000  1991  6813  7  6820 
1992  2131  2  2133  1992  7125  8  7133 
1993  2286  3  2289  1993  8281  10  8291 
1994  2341  3  2344  1994  8748  14  8762 
1995  2334  5  2339  1995  9453  25  9478 
1996  2372  11  2383  1996  9667  37  9704 
1997  2340  17  2357  1997  9457  58  9515 
1998  2361  22  2383  1998  9663  73  9736 
1999  2421  33  2454  1999  9741  82  9823 
2000  2470  39  2509  2000  9335  99  9434 
2001  2626  47  2673  2001  8744  103  8847 
2002  2849  39  2888  2002  8354  94  8448 
2003  2926  46  2972  2003  8046  80  8126 
2004  2789  38  2827  2004  7632  68  7700 
2005  231  8  239  2005  6727  59  6786 
Mean  2298  21  2319  Mean  8519  55  8574 
Total  34476  314  34790  Total  127786  817  128603 
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We address this issue by using ranks instead of the original values of each attribute. 
To gauge the impact of these sample selection criteria, we report in Panel B of Table 
1 the number of (backdating and non-backdating) observations with sufficient data to 
estimate at least one earnings attribute. The selection criteria bias the sample towards 
surviving firms. We remove the bottom and top 1 percent of the earnings attributes 
observations to mitigate the impact of outliers.
24 Our final sample of non-backdating 
firms with available data to estimate all seven earnings attributes comprises 34,476 
firm-year observations (5760 unique firms). 
Table  2—Panel  A  presents  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  seven  earnings 
attributes for non-backdating firms. Panel B holds the same, but for the sample of 
backdating firms. Note that all earnings attributes are coded such that high values 
denote  lower  accounting  quality.    The  distribution  of  earnings  attributes  for  non-
backdating  firm  is  comparable  to  the  one  reported  by  Francis  et  al.  (2004).  For 
example,  these  authors  report  average  (median)  Accrual  Quality,  Timeliness,  and 
Conservatism of 0.026 (0.019), -0.466 (-0.465), and -0.547 (-1.000), whereas we find 
mean  (median)  values  of  0.028  (0.017),  -0.216  (-0.314),  and  -0.434  (-1.000) 
respectively.  
Compared  to  the  non-backdating  firms,  the  average  (median)  values  of 
Accrual Quality and Smoothness, as shown in Panel B of Table 2, are higher for 
backdating firms, implying worse accounting quality for these attributes. For all other 
earnings attributes, the means are lower for backdating firms, suggestive that these 
firms have in fact higher accounting quality than the remainder of the sample. The 
median values suggest the same pattern, except for Timeliness; the median backdating 
firm has less timely earnings than the median non-backdating firm.
 25 
Panel C presents the Pearson (Spearman) correlation for the earnings attributes 
and an indicator variable, Backdating, which takes the value of unity if the sample 
firm in  year t has been identified as having backdated its stock options and zero 
otherwise. The correlations between Backdating and the earnings attributes provide 
first  evidence  that  backdating  firms  have  different  earnings  attributes  than  non-
backdating firms. All earnings attributes are significantly associated with Backdating 
                                                       
24 We obtain very similar results when we winsorize the sample at the bottom and top 1 percent instead 
of eliminating these observations.  
25 The correlation table in Francis et al. (2004) provides also evidence that the earnings attributes are 
not completely overlapping and therefore that different earnings attributes might respond differently to 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics on the Earnings Attributes of Backdating and Non-
backdating Firms 
This table provides the distribution of seven earnings attributes (refer to Appendix 1 
for variable definitions) for non-backdating (Panel A) and backdating firms (Panel B). 
The columns present summary statistics calculated across  all available  firm-years. 
Panel C present Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal between 
the variables. Corresponding p-values are reported in italics. 
 
Panel A: Non-backdating firms 
Attribute  Mean  Std. Dev.  10%  25%  Median  75%  90%  N 
AccrualQuality  0.028  0.031  0.004  0.008  0.017  0.035  0.066  34476 
Predictability  1.151  3.373  0.085  0.177  0.402  0.913  2.053  34476 
Persistence  -0.253  0.504  -0.936  -0.563  -0.219  0.094  0.356  34476 
Smoothness  0.787  0.428  0.277  0.456  0.743  1.034  1.336  34476 
Relevance  -0.254  0.458  -0.845  -0.652  -0.297  0.127  0.418  34476 
Timeliness  -0.216  0.582  -0.908  -0.727  -0.314  0.211  0.623  34476 
Conservatism  -0.434  22.434  -8.019  -1.336  -1.000  0.732  7.358  34476 
Panel B: Backdating firms 
Attribute  Mean  Std. Dev.  10%  25%  Median  75%  90%  N 
AccrualQuality  0.031  0.031  0.005  0.010  0.021  0.039  0.075  314 
Predictability  0.709  0.977  0.053  0.135  0.368  0.868  1.858  314 
Persistence  -0.361  0.588  -1.179  -0.802  -0.252  0.061  0.321  314 
Smoothness  0.919  0.473  0.363  0.572  0.894  1.153  1.547  314 
Relevance  -0.251  0.467  -0.840  -0.643  -0.335  0.089  0.473  314 
Timeliness  -0.113  0.598  -0.851  -0.639  -0.202  0.340  0.770  314 
Conservatism  -2.622  25.452  -11.568  -2.159  -1.000  -0.214  7.258  314 
Panel C: Correlations among the backdating indicator variable and earnings attributes 
    Accrual             
  Backdating  Quality  Predictability Persistence Smoothness Relevance Timeliness Conservatism 
Backdating  1.000  0.010  -0.012  -0.020  0.029  0.001  0.017  -0.009 
    0.053  0.020  0.000  0.000  0.913  0.002  0.086 
AccrualQuality  0.016  1.000  0.159  0.127  0.353  0.032  0.049  0.009 
  0.004    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.094 
Predictability  -0.009  0.284  1.000  0.061  0.104  0.019  0.014  0.000 
  0.077  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.008  0.959 
Persistence  -0.017  0.161  0.251  1.000  0.058  0.057  0.040  0.009 
  0.002  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.008 
Smoothness  0.027  0.411  0.304  0.060  1.000  0.044  0.053  0.011 
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000  0.036 
Relevance  0.000  0.019  0.102  0.058  0.046  1.000  0.442  0.021 
  0.947  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000 
Timeliness  0.017  0.031  0.068  0.025  0.045  0.452  1.000  0.001 
  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.861 
Conservatism  -0.020  0.035  0.047  0.041  0.024  0.074  0.007  1.000 
   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.191   56                                          Essays on the Role of Managerial Type in Financial Reporting 
 
except  for  Relevance.  The  correlation  between  Backdating  and  Accrual  Quality, 
Smoothness, and Timeliness is positive and significant at the1 percent level or better. 
This suggests that backdating firms have lower earnings quality as measured by these 
three  attributes.  At  the  same  time,  the  correlation  between  Backdating  and 
Predictability, Persistence, and Conservatism is negative and significant at the 10 
percent level or better, which implies better accounting quality for backdating firms.  
The correlations among the seven earnings attributes confirm earlier findings 
that  these  attributes  overlap.  For  example,  Accrual  Quality  and  Smoothness  are 
strongly  positively  correlated  (correlation  equals  0.353,  p-value<0.001).  More  in 
general, the correlations between the accounting-based attributes are significant. 
Following  Francis  et  al.  (2004),  we  view  earnings  attributes  as  the  joint 
outcome  of  managerial  discretion  and  intrinsic,  fundamental  economic  forces.  By 
controlling for these latter (innate) factors, Francis et al. tease out the discretionary 
component of the earnings attributes. Controlling for innate determinants of earnings 
attributes is of especial importance in our context, as prior evidence suggests that 
backdating is more prevalent for high-tech firms, smaller firms, and firms with high 
stock price volatility (Heron and Lie 2006).  Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics 
for eight innate determinants of earnings attributes. We discuss these determinants 
briefly below and provide more complete definitions in Appendix 1.  
 Backdating firms are on average somewhat larger than non-backdating firms 
(mean Size equals 6.785 and 5.292, respectively), which is somewhat surprising given 
earlier evidence. Average cash flow variability ) (CFO σ , sales variability ) (sales σ , 
and  operating  cycle  (OperCycle)  do  not  differ  much  between  the  two  groups. 
Untabulated  tests  only  show  a  significant  difference  for  the  median  cash  flow 
variability. Backdating firms, however, on average report fewer losses over the past 
six  years  (NegEarn)  than  non-backdating  firms  (mean  equals  1.338  and  1.719, 
respectively). In addition, the intangible intensity (Int_Intensity), i.e. the sum of the 
firm’s reported R&D and advertising expense as a proportion of its sales revenues, is 
lower for backdating firms (mean equals 0.043) than for non-backdating firms (mean 
equals 0.119), albeit that unreported test show this difference not to be significant. In 
contrast, capital intensity  (Cap_Intensity), which is the ratio of net book value of 
property, plant, and equipment to total assets is significantly lower for backdating 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics on the Innate Determinants of Earnings Attributes 
 
This table provides the distribution of the innate determinants of earnings attributes 
(refer  to  Appendix  1  for  variable  definitions)  for  non-backdating  (Panel  A)  and 
backdating firms (Panel B). The columns present summary statistics calculated across 
all available firm-years. 
Panel A: Non-backdating firms 
Innate determinant  Mean  Std. Dev.  10%  25%  Median  75%  90%  N 
Size  5.292  2.330  2.331  3.579  5.195  6.925  8.432  34476 
σ(CFO)  0.116  0.409  0.025  0.041  0.072  0.125  0.221  34476 
σ(sales)  0.226  1.042  0.047  0.082  0.147  0.258  0.427  34476 
OperCycle  4.691  0.780  3.846  4.306  4.754  5.149  5.499  33504 
NegEarn  1.719  1.968  0.000  0.000  1.000  3.000  5.000  34476 
Int_Intensity  0.119  5.066  0.000  0.007  0.018  0.043  0.090  34068 
Int_Dummy  0.130  0.337  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  34476 
Cap_Intensity  0.322  0.241  0.057  0.128  0.259  0.475  0.709  34459 
Panel B: Backdating firms 
Innate determinant  Mean  Std. Dev.  10%  25%  Median  75%  90%  N 
Size  6.785  1.415  5.118  5.775  6.778  7.720  8.703  314 
σ(CFO)  0.113  0.111  0.032  0.054  0.079  0.136  0.208  314 
σ(sales)  0.201  0.237  0.068  0.097  0.142  0.233  0.351  314 
OperCycle  4.643  0.761  3.533  4.288  4.730  5.148  5.471  313 
NegEarn  1.338  1.552  0.000  0.000  1.000  2.000  4.000  314 
Int_Intensity  0.043  0.046  0.005  0.010  0.030  0.064  0.102  314 
Int_Dummy  0.051  0.220  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  314 
Cap_Intensity  0.204  0.195  0.040  0.072  0.138  0.244  0.456  314 
 
Int_Dummy is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms with Int_Intensity=0, and zero 
otherwise. The descriptive statistics confirm the earlier result for Int_Intensity that 
backdating firms more often report zero R&D or advertising expenses.  
Together,  these  findings  suggest  that  differences  in  innate  determinants 
between backdating and non-backdating firms are mostly concentrated in size, the 
incidence of reported losses and the capital and intangible intensity of these firms.  
 
3.4  Empirical  analysis  of  the  earnings  attributes  of  backdating  and  non-
backdating firms 
3.4.1 Main findings   
In  this  section  we  examine  the  earnings  attributes  of  backdating  and  non-
backdating firms in an effort to provide an answer to our research question on how 
differences in managerial traits affect the financial reporting behavior of firms. We 
estimate the following equation using the combined sample of backdating and non-
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  j Attribute is one of the seven earnings attributes (AccrualQuality, Persistence, 
Predictability, Smoothness, Relevance, Timeliness, and Conservatism; see Appendix 1 
for all variable definitions). We estimate pooled rank regressions using Newey-West 
(1987) standard errors, which are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent.
26 
27 We rank each dependent variable each year and form 20 portfolios. We then assign 
each firm based on its rank to one of these portfolios; firms in the top portfolio have 
the highest (5 percent) values on the earnings attribute, while firms in the bottom 
portfolio have the lowest (5 percent) values. Given our coding scheme, this places 
firms with the lowest (highest) accounting quality in the top (bottom) portfolios. We 
use the portfolio rank of each attribute as the dependent variable in our regressions to 
alleviate concerns about outliers and to reduce the problems of measurement error due 
to short estimation windows.   
Table 4 presents our findings. Consistent with Francis et al. (2004), the innate 
determinants  are  jointly  important  to  explain  the  variance  in  the  seven  earnings 
attributes. Adjusted R2 are of similar magnitude as in Francis et al. for the market-
based attributes, but somewhat lower for the accounting-based attributes.  
  Hypothesis H1 states that the earnings attributes of backdating firms will be of 
lower quality than those of non-backdating firms. We only find limited support for 
this hypothesis. Recall that all attributes are coded such that higher values denote 
lower accounting quality. Thus, under H1, the sign of the coefficient on Backdating 
should  be  positive.  We  find  indeed  positive  and  significant  coefficients  for 
AccrualQuality  (coefficient=1.375,  p-value=0.000),  Smoothness  (coefficient=2.015, 
p-value=0.000),  and  Timeliness  (coefficient=0.760,  p-value=0.018).  In  contrast, 
however, we find that backdating firms appear to have higher earnings quality as 
measured  by  Persistence  (coefficient=-0.744,  p-value=0.028),  Predictability 
(coefficient=-1.791,  p-value=0.000),  and  Conservatism  (coefficient=-1.112,  p-
value=0.000).  The  Relevance  of  earnings  between  the  two  groups  does  not
                                                       
26 We  use  rank  regressions  to  reduce  the  errors-in-variables  problem  in  the  dependent  variable. 
However, we obtain basically the same results if we use the original values of the earnings attributes.  
27 A pooled regression framework is more appropriate in our setting given the temporal pattern of 
backdating (with few beginning-of-sample period observations). When we use  Fama-MacBeth (1973)  
estimates of Equation (1) derived from annual cross-sectional rank regressions, our results are robust 
(unreported), although Persistence is only marginally significant (p-value=0.15, two-tailed).                                                   
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Table 4 
Pooled Rank Regressions of Earnings Attributes on Stock Option Backdating Status and Innate Determinants 
The table presents pooled rank regressions of each of the seven earnings attributes on an indicator variable (1=backdating firm, 0=otherwise) and innate determinants. The 
columns contain p-values based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors below the estimated coefficients. Significant coefficients (p-value<10 percent) are highlighted by 
using bold and italics. The sample consists of firms with data available on all variables needed to compute the seven earnings attributes (refer to Table 1 for details). We 




Panel A Regressions of earnings attributes on stock option backdating status and innate determinants 
 
Equations  Dependent  Backdating  Size  OperCycle  σ(CFO)  σ(sales)   NegEarn  Int_Intensity  Int_Dummy  Cap_Intensity  Adj R2 
Eq.1  AccrualQuality  1.375   -0.642   0.476   2.974   0.213   0.971   -0.007   -0.355   -4.146   0.401  
    0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.170   0.000   0.474   0.000   0.000    
Eq.2  Persistence  -0.744   0.015   0.333   -0.360   0.053   0.485   0.006   0.233   1.337   0.026  
    0.028   0.361   0.000   0.061   0.073   0.000   0.243   0.013   0.000    
Eq.3  Predictability  -1.791   0.909   0.123   2.039   0.258   1.387   -0.008   0.085   0.520   0.199  
    0.000   0.000   0.004   0.010   0.006   0.000   0.291   0.328   0.001    
Eq.4  Smoothness  2.015   -0.091   0.133   -3.256   -0.090   1.172   0.001   -0.273   0.814   0.143  
    0.000   0.000   0.001   0.000   0.009   0.000   0.603   0.002   0.000    
Eq.5  Relevance  -0.321   0.297   0.201   -0.243   0.022   0.417   -0.019   0.243   0.497   0.019  
    0.329   0.000   0.000   0.238   0.554   0.000   0.000   0.011   0.001    
Eq.6  Timeliness  0.760   0.229   0.120   -0.066   0.120   0.392   -0.018   -0.111   0.366   0.015  
    0.018   0.000   0.006   0.762   0.000   0.000   0.001   0.247   0.017    
Eq.7  Conservatism  -1.112   0.009   0.101   -0.726   -0.002   0.246   -0.011   0.137   0.304   0.006  
    0.000   0.560   0.020   0.002   0.955   0.000   0.000   0.144   0.045    
Panel B Coefficient equality tests on backdating  
Contrast 
(sign)  F-statistic  p-value  Contrast  F-statistic  p-value  Contrast  F-statistic  p-value  Contrast  F-statistic  p-value 
Eq.1 vs. 
Eq. 5 (+)  17.060   0.000  
Eq.2 vs. 
Eq. 5 (-)  0.880   0.348  
Eq.3 vs. 
Eq. 5 (-)  11.780   0.001  
Eq.4 vs.  
Eq. 5 (+)  27.780   0.000  
Eq.1 vs. 
Eq. 6 (+)  2.240   0.135  
Eq.2 vs. 
Eq. 6 (-)  10.780   0.001  
Eq.3 vs. 
Eq. 6 (-)  34.330   0.000  
Eq.4 vs.  
Eq. 6 (+)  7.960   0.005  
Eq.1 vs. 
Eq. 7 (+)  36.600   0.000  
Eq.2 vs. 
Eq. 7 (+)  0.660   0.415  
Eq.3 vs. 
Eq. 7 (-)  2.460   0.117  
Eq.4 vs.  
Eq. 7 (+)  49.160   0.000  
j
j
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appear to differ.  
  Results are also not consistent with our hypothesis H2, in which we argue that 
as accounting-based attributes are more costly to reduce (since market participants 
seem to attach more value to these), the difference in earnings quality will be more 
pronounced for market-based attributes. Again, this is not the case: while backdating 
firms  have  poorer  Timeliness,  they  also  have  better  Conservatism.  Perhaps  more 
significantly  though,  there  are  substantial  differences  within  the  accounting-based 
attributes.  Backdating  firms  have  better  Predictability  and  Persistence,  but  worse 
AccrualQuality and Smoothness.  
We  test  hypothesis  H2  more  formally  by  estimating  the  seven  earnings 
attributes in a seemingly unrelated regressions framework and by imposing cross-
equation  restrictions.  We  compare  the  coefficient  on  Backdating  for  the  four 
accounting-based earnings attributes with each of the three market-based attributes. 
This procedure is appropriate as the earnings attributes continue to be portfolio ranks 
as before.  The results are presented in Panel B of Table 4. Under hypothesis H2, we 
expect that the coefficient on Backdating is higher for market-based attributes than for 
accounting-based  attributes.  The  F-tests,  which  impose  equal  coefficients  on 
Backdating  between  two  equations  at  the  same  time,  show  that  the  effect  of 
Backdating on accounting-based attributes is significantly larger in five cases, while 
the  effect  of  market-based  measures  is  larger  in  three  cases.  Clearly,  we  cannot 
conclude that market-based measures generally show a more substantial reduction in 
quality than accounting-based measures. 
3.4.2 Additional analysis   
As  there  is  substantial  clustering  of  backdating  firms  in  some  industries, 
concerns  can  be  raised  that  using  the  Compustat  universe  as  benchmark  for  their 
earnings attributes is less appropriate. We therefore estimate Equation (1) again in a 
sample  of  firms  that  consists  only  of  those  2-digit  SIC  industries  that  contain 
backdating firms. We further expand Equation (1) by including industry indicator 
variables. Results are presented in Table 5. As before, we use pooled rank regressions 
and  base  our  inferences  on  Newey-West  (1987)  standard  errors.  Our  results  are 
consistent with those reported in Table 4. Backdating firms have better Predictability, 
Persistence,  and  Conservatism,  but  worse  AccrualQuality,  Smoothness,  and 
Timeliness.                                                        
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Table 5 
Pooled Rank Regressions of Earnings Attributes on Stock Option Backdating Status and Innate Determinants in a Sample of Firms 
Matched on Industry 
The table presents pooled rank regressions of each of the seven earnings attributes on an indicator variable (1=backdating firm, 0=otherwise) and 
innate determinants. The columns contain p-values based on Newey-West (1987) standard errors below the estimated coefficients. Significant 
coefficients (p-value<10 percent) are highlighted by using bold and italics. The sample consists of firms with data available on all variables 
needed to compute the seven earnings attributes but drawn only from those 2-digit industries that contain backdating-firm observations (refer to 
Table 1 for details). Hence, the sample in this test is industry-matched. We delete the top and bottom 1 percent of observations to control for 
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Dependent  Backdating  Size  OperCycle  σ(CFO)    σ(sales)  NegEarn  Int_Intensity  Int_Dummy  Cap_Intensity  Indus_Dummy  Adj R2 
AccrualQuality  1.069   -0.613   0.267   3.169   0.222   0.926   -0.001   -0.219   -2.809   Yes  0.363 
  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.001   0.187   0.000   0.859   0.048   0.000      
Persistence  -0.664   -0.001   0.324   -0.363   -0.002   0.435   0.008   0.029   -0.685   Yes  0.034 
  0.052   0.972   0.000   0.118   0.959   0.000   0.056   0.834   0.007      
Predictability  -1.720   0.914   0.205   2.067   0.273   1.292   -0.001   -0.110   0.656   Yes  0.209 
  0.000   0.000   0.001   0.035   0.023   0.000   0.872   0.387   0.017      
Smoothness  1.508   -0.097   -0.003   -3.078   0.020   1.048   0.001   -0.294   1.153   Yes  0.158 
  0.000   0.000   0.952   0.001   0.604   0.000   0.546   0.027   0.000      
Relevance  -0.478   0.290   0.288   -0.147   0.082   0.380   -0.019   0.119   -0.140   Yes  0.020 
  0.148   0.000   0.000   0.569   0.134   0.000   0.000   0.400   0.591      
Timeliness  0.659   0.238   0.195   0.032   0.136   0.379   -0.018   -0.277   0.171   Yes  0.017 
  0.041   0.000   0.002   0.908   0.000   0.000   0.002   0.049   0.512      
Conservatism  -0.839   -0.010   0.135   -0.855   -0.062   0.255   -0.009   0.189   0.261   Yes  0.009 
   0.008   0.651   0.032   0.007   0.041   0.000   0.000   0.172   0.320       
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  Recent work suggests that the quality of a firm’s corporate governance may 
impact earnings attributes (Garcia Lara, Garcia Osma, and Penalva in press). As it is 
easy to imagine that the governance characteristics of a firm also affect the likelihood 
of becoming engaged in the option backdating scandal, we conduct some additional 
analysis  to  evaluate  the  extent  of  its  effect  on  our  findings.  We  obtain  corporate 
governance scores (G-index) from Andrew Metrick’s website.
28 This dataset contains 
firm-specific governance scores for the period 1990-2006. The G-index is constructed 
using data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). Details on the 
construction of the index are described in Gompers et al. (2003). A G-index score is 
available for 57 backdating firms (305 firm-years) and for 1579 non-backdating firms 
(13,702 firm-year observations). We include the G-index as an additional regressor in 
Equation (1) and estimate pooled rank regressions as before. Our results (not tabulated) 
show  that  while  the  G-index  is  a  significant  explanatory  variable  for  Persistence, 
Predictability, Smoothness, and Relevance, none of our original inferences is affected 
by its inclusion in Equation (1).  
3.4.3 Discussion  
Thus,  our  regression  findings,  which  tease  out  the  discretionary  reporting 
behavior from that caused by  fundamental innate factors, confirm the picture that 
arises from the simple correlations that we presented before. While it is clear that the 
accounting properties of these two groups of firms differ and that these differences 
can be ascribed to the discretionary actions of the managers involved, it is also clear 
that the revealed managerial traits associated with backdating do not unambiguously 
lead to lower accounting quality as measured by these seven earnings attributes. 
It  also  appears  that  firms  compensate  lower  quality  on  one  attribute  with 
higher quality on another within the same subset of accounting-based or market-based 
attributes,  respectively.  This  apparent  balancing  could  be  a  strategy  to  reduce  the 
adverse economic consequences of lowering accounting quality across the board. It 
could also be that the lower AccrualQuality provides managers with the reporting 
means to increase the persistence and predictability of their earnings, perhaps in an 
attempt  to  avert  investor  scrutiny  by  reducing  their  uncertainty  about  future  cash 
flows. Similarly, although backdating firms have more conservative earnings, they are 
also less timely. Thus, while backdating firms reflect economic losses more quickly 
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into earnings than gains compared to non-backdating firms, their accounting numbers 
do not match up as well with economic fundamentals as their peers. Again, this might 
be viewed as a the outcome of a “balancing” strategy, where the better performance 
on conservatism is used to direct the attention of investors away from the fact that 
earnings do not line up with economic income.   
All  of  this  remains  speculative  and  this  is  caused  in  part  by  a  lack  of 
understanding in the literature of the mutual relations between the seven earnings 
attributes  (Verdi  2005;  Barton  et  al.  2007).  To  obtain  a  more  unequivocal 
understanding of the reporting behavior of (non-)backdating firms, we conduct a ratio 
analysis inspired by treatments in many financial statement textbooks about how to 
assess the quality of annual reports. This exercise may also provide some background 
against which our findings on earnings attributes can be evaluated.  
 
3.5 Ratio analysis for matched samples of backdating and non-backdating firms 
Financial statement analysis has traditionally been the recommended approach 
to  ascertain  the  quality  of  a  firm’s  annual  report  (Penman  2007).  Detecting 
intertemporal income shifting is a key element of such analysis. In particular, we 
conjecture  that  issues  surrounding  the  application  of  revenue  recognition  and 
matching principles provide a good starting point for evaluating accounting quality 
(Penman  2003).  While  no  large-sample  study  can  expect  to  achieve  the  level  of 
understanding gleaned from a well-executed fundamental analysis, we rely on easy-
to-implement quality diagnostics that have been recognized as helpful in detecting 
manipulation  of  accounting  numbers  (Penman  2007).  While  the  list  of  potential 
quality diagnostics that we could have used is lengthy, we use the following criteria to 
guide  our  choice.  First,  data  needed  to  compute  the  quality  diagnostic  should  be 
available for a broad cross section of our sample. This eliminates any diagnostic that 
is industry-specific.
29 Second, as we are concerned with (the influence of managerial 
traits on) the overall-quality of accounting, we only consider “summary” diagnostics 
that deal with the key products of the financial statements (sales, expenses, profits, 
assets).   
Our quality diagnostics aim to detect manipulation of sales revenues, expenses, 
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manipulation. Indeed, one reason why data may not be available for some firms is because they decided 
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and profits. We discuss some diagnostics below for illustrative purposes and provide 
complete  descriptions  in  Appendix  1.  The  diagnostics  used  to  detect  sales 
manipulation  commonly  rely  on  the  idea  that  cash  flow  from  sales  cannot  be 
manipulated by accounting, so differences between cash flow from sales and sales 
revenues are due to accounting accruals. In this spirit, we compute Revenues/Cash 
flow from operations and other ratios that compare sales revenues with accounting 
accruals (e.g., Revenues/Accounts receivable). Expense manipulation is indicated by 
diagnostics that relate discretionary expenses to the level of sales activity in the firm. 
Thus, we use Selling, General, and Administrative Expense/Revenues as a diagnostic 
for  the  amount  of  SG&A  expense  conditional  on  sales  revenues.  Finally,  we  use 
diagnostics  based  on  profit  margin  (operating  income/sales)  and  asset  turnover 
(sales/net assets) to signal potential manipulation of net income. The basic intuition 
for using asset turnover is that accruals reflected in earnings are also reflected in net 
assets  by  the  implications  of  double-entry  bookkeeping.  Thus,  if  managers  have 
recognized revenues optimistically in the past, net assets will be positively biased (see 
also, Barton and Simko 2002). Overstated net assets generate comparatively fewer 
sales and consequently, asset turnover is lower for these firms. High profit margins 
may  result  from  shifting  expenses  to  future  periods,  which  is  also  indicative  of 
earnings management.  
Taken together, our diagnostics provide a comprehensive first assessment of 
the quality of financial statements based directly on the reporting behavior at the level 
of  individual  line  items.  Comparing  the  comprehensiveness  of  seven  earnings 
attributes and our diagnostic tests, we may perceive that our diagnostics are only 
accounting  based.  However,  conceptually,  our  diagnostics  also  reflect  market 
attributes as these manifest themselves in earnings through accruals. For example, 
firms  which  recognize  revenues  (losses)  less  (more)  aggressively  will  have  lower 
earnings and are more conservative compared to firms which do the opposite. At the 
same time, the accruals will also influence the timeliness and the value relevance of 
earnings in the sense that whether accruals are reported in a timely manner and how 
well accruals reflect the true economic performance of firms.  
In the design of our tests, we are aware of the fact that any particular score on 
the quality diagnostics is meaningless (i.e., scores do not map neatly into a continuum 
of accounting quality). What matters is the score of a firm compared with its peer. We 
therefore use a matched-sample design, in which we match each backdating firm each                                                  
                                                                                                          
                                                                                          
                                                                   
                                                                                                            
Chapter 3   Top Level Executive Characteristics and Earnings Attributes                                                                                                                65 
                                                                                                 
Table 6 
Distribution of Backdating Firm-Year Observations by Industry 
This table presents the distribution of backdating firm-year observations used in the financial statement analysis tests by four-digit SIC 
industry. 
SIC   Industry Name  N  SIC  Industry Name  N 
1311  Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas  8  4899  Communications Services, NEC  8 
1531  Operative Builders  8  5045  Wholesale-Computers & Peripheral Equipment & Software  9 
2711  Newspapers: Publishing or Publishing & Printing  4  5093  Wholesale-Scrap & Waste Materials  3 
2834  Pharmaceutical Preparations  17  5211  Retail-Lumber & Other Building Materials Dealers  11 
2836  Biological Products, (No Diagnostic Substances)  6  5600  Retail-Apparel & Accessory Stores  3 
2842  Specialty Cleaning, Polishing and Sanitation Preparations  10  5700  Retail-Home Furniture, Furnishings & Equipment Stores  7 
3290  Abrasive, Asbestos & Misc Nonmetallic Mineral Prods  7  5712  Retail-Furniture Stores  3 
3559  Special Industry Machinery, NEC  29  5812  Retail-Eating Places  21 
3571  Electronic Computers  6  5912  Retail-Drug Stores and Proprietary Stores  12 
3572  Computer Storage Devices  19  5940  Retail-Miscellaneous Shopping Goods Stores  13 
3576  Computer Communications Equipment  25  5945  Retail-Hobby, Toy & Game Shops  11 
3577  Computer Peripheral Equipment, NEC  6  5961  Retail-Catalog & Mail-Order Houses  10 
3585  Air-Cond & Warm Air Heatg Equip & Comm & Indl Refrig Equip  6  6324  Hospital & Medical Service Plans  4 
3661  Telephone & Telegraph Apparatus  17  6331  Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance  11 
3663  Radio & Tv Broadcasting & Communications Equipment  22  6794  Patent Owners & Lessors  11 
3672  Printed Circuit Boards  13  7311  Services-Advertising Agencies  5 
3674  Semiconductors & Related Devices  117  7330  Services-Mailing, Reproduction, Commercial Art & Photography  4 
3678  Electronic Connectors  12  7359  Services-Equipment Rental & Leasing, NEC  4 
3812  Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical Sys  6  7370  Services-Computer Programming, Data Processing, Etc.  21 
3825  Instruments For Meas & Testing of Electricity & Elec Signals  5  7372  Services-Prepackaged Software  144 
3827  Optical Instruments & Lenses  20  7373  Services-Computer Integrated Systems Design  21 
3841  Surgical & Medical Instruments & Apparatus  6  7374  Services-Computer Processing & Data Preparation  12 
3842  Orthopedic, Prosthetic & Surgical Appliances & Supplies  10  7812  Services-Motion Picture & Video Tape Production  5 
3845  Electromedical & Electrotherapeutic Apparatus  7  8060  Services-Hospitals  15 
4412  Deep Sea Foreign Transportation of Freight  2  8200  Services-Educational Services  12 
4812  Radiotelephone Communications  5  8700  Services-Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management  7 
4841  Cable & Other Pay Television Services  6  Total      786 66                                  Essays on the Role of Managerial Type in Financial Reporting                                 
                                                                                                 
year to its closest-size four-digit SIC code industry competitor. We code the sales and 
expense  quality  diagnostic  such  that  a  negative  mean  (median)  difference  implies 
lower  accounting  quality  (as  measured  by  the  diagnostic)  for  backdating  firms 
compared with their industry peers. As the data requirements are less strict for the 
tests we describe below than for the earnings attributes tests, we have an initial sample 
of backdating firms that comprises 786 firm-years. There is some industry clustering, 
most observations are in the semi-conductor (117 obs.) and prepackaged software 
(144 obs.) industries. Details are presented in Table 6. We remove firms that appear to 
have experienced extreme growth through acquisitions (as measured by changes in 
sales revenues of more than 50 percent) to avoid misleading inferences especially in 
tests based on changes of our quality diagnostics.
30  We also eliminate the top and 
bottom 1 percent of each quality diagnostic to mitigate the effect of outliers. Our final 
sample  (matched  and  backdating  firms)  varies  between  251  and  555  paired 
observations depending on data availability.  
Table 7 presents our findings. Under hypothesis H1, we continue to expect 
that backdating firms have lower accounting quality than non-backdating firms. Our 
results are consistent with this expectation throughout. Note first, however, despite 
matching on size, non-backdating firms are somewhat larger than backdating firms.
31 
The quality diagnostics  for sales manipulations are significantly  negative at the 5 
percent level or better. Note, however, that the median difference of Revenue/Cash 
flow from operations ratio (REVENUE/CASH), is positive (median difference=0.144), 
although not significant (p-value=0.408). Together, these diagnostics suggests that 
backdating  firms  more  aggressively  book  sales  than  non-backdating  firms.  As  a 
consequence, sales revenues become a poorer predictor of future cash flows, thus 
lowering the accounting quality. 
Similarly,  our  diagnostics  for  expense  manipulation  show  generally  lower 
quality (more expense manipulation) for backdating firms. There are, however, two 
exceptions. First, the average difference between the two groups in Selling, General, 
and  Administrative  Expenses/Revenues  (SGA/REVENUE)  is  not  significant  and 
neither  is  the  Bad  debt  expense/Accounts  receivable  (BADDEBT/REC).  Second, 
                                                       
30 Unreported  results  show  that  our  inferences  about  the  mean  difference  between  backdating  and 
matched firms on all our quality diagnostics are unchanged if we do not delete firms that have been 
involved in acquisitions.  
31 When we control for size in the tests of the mean difference of each ratio, we continue to find very 
much the same pattern as reported in Table 7. Our inferences remain unchanged.                                                                                                          
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Table 7 
Analysis of Quality Diagnostics Based on Accounting Ratios  
This table provides the results of t-tests of the mean and Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the median for the difference between financial 
statement ratios of paired backdating and matched firm. Refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions. Matching is on industry, year, and size. 
We delete firm pairs that have experienced extreme sales growth or decline (>50 percent) and we also delete the top and bottom 1 percent of 
the distribution of each ratio. Reported p-values are highlighted by using bold and italics when significant (p-value<10 percent), All p-values 
are from two-tailed tests. “Signed rank” is the Wilcoxon test statistic.  
 
Panel A: Financial statement line items difference between backdating firms and non-backdating firms 
                  Signed Rank test  p-value 
Variable  N*  Mean  StdDev  Median  Minimum  Maximum  t-test of the mean  p-value  of the median   
SIZE  555  0.022  0.075  0.001  -0.151  0.526  6.848  0.000  22948.500  0.000 
REVENUE/CASH  548  -6.173  62.532  0.144  -519.907  210.898  -2.311  0.021  -3074.000  0.408 
REVENUE/REC  512  -2.156  15.451  -0.458  -124.459  53.261  -3.157  0.002  -8969.000  0.007 
∆REVENUE/∆REC  513  -8.948  32.760  -2.904  -226.961  96.058  -6.186  0.000  -33201.500  0.000 
NONINCOM  550  -6.012  40.695  -0.683  -372.723  150.000  -3.465  0.001  -15257.500  0.000 
SGA/REVENUE  466  -0.006  0.286  0.018  -1.825  0.842  -0.488  0.626  4416.500  0.128 
PENSION/SGA  254  -0.005  0.033  -0.004  -0.125  0.258  -2.194  0.029  -5977.000  0.000 
CGS/REVENUE  494  -0.155  0.394  -0.201  -2.081  1.003  -8.715  0.000  -26615.500  0.000 
DA/REVENUE  532  -0.024  0.172  -0.003  -2.321  0.268  -3.176  0.002  -7397.000  0.037 
RD/REVENUE  430  0.010  0.222  0.002  -2.677  0.741  0.976  0.330  7565.000  0.000 
BADDEBT/REC  288  -0.001  0.074  0.002  -0.336  0.244  -0.159  0.874  1193.500  0.392 
∆ BADDEBT /∆ REC  251  -0.338  2.600  -0.008  -29.813  4.334  -2.058  0.041  -1463.500  0.199 
PM  551  0.109  0.640  0.020  -2.282  6.548  4.005  0.000  15505.000  0.000 
∆PM  534  0.072  0.673  0.005  -4.518  6.290  2.470  0.014  6837.500  0.055 
ATO  552  0.004  0.705  -0.012  -2.587  4.742  0.140  0.889  -3617.000  0.334 
∆ATO  536  -0.023  0.305  -0.005  -1.584  1.090  -1.724  0.085  -4370.000  0.222 
Panel B: Financial statement line items change of backdating and non-backdating firms 
ATO_SAMPLE  555  -0.028  0.197  -0.001  -1.120  0.605  -3.341  0.001  -7507.000  0.047 
ATO_MATCHED  536  -0.007  0.225  0.000  -0.824  1.312  -0.716  0.474  -1780.000  0.620 68                                  Essays on the Role of Managerial Type in Financial Reporting  
                                                     
 
it  appears  that  backdating  firms  expend  more  on  Research  &  Development  in 
percentage of their sales than their peers. All other ratios are strongly significant (p-
values<5 percent) and suggest that backdating firms expend fewer costs compared to 
their peers to achieve a given level of sales activity. Either these firms are exceedingly 
efficient, or this is evidence cost manipulation. 
Our final set of quality diagnostics is in a sense the most comprehensive. The 
idea is that both expense and sales manipulation are used to achieve higher profit 
margins. Increased profit margins imply, due to the articulation between the income 
statement and the balance sheet, higher net assets and thus lower asset turnover. Thus, 
manipulating firms are more likely to exhibit high and increasing profit margins and 
low and decreasing asset turnover. Indeed, consistent with the pattern that arises from 
the sales and cost manipulation diagnostics, we find that backdating firms have on 
average  higher  profit  margins  (i.e.,  net  income  to  sales)  than  their  peers  (mean 
difference=0.109; p-value=0.000). We also find that the change in profit margin is on 
average higher for backdating firms (mean difference=0.072; p-value=0.014). 
The  mean  difference  in  the  change  of  asset  turnover  is  negative,  which 
suggests that asset turnover is deteriorating for backdating firms (mean difference=-
0.023; p-value=0.085). We do not find a significant difference for the level of asset 
turnover between backdating and non-backdating firms (mean difference=0.004; p-
value=0.889). Nevertheless, it is helpful to examine the means of the change in asset 
turnover for both groups separately. The change in asset turnover of the backdating 
sample equals -0.028, which is significant at the 1 percent level. The matched firms, 
somewhat surprisingly, also exhibit on average negative changes in asset turnover but 
this is not significant.  
In sum, the conclusions drawn from the financial statement analysis tests are 
much less ambiguous than those from the earlier analyses based on earnings attributes. 
Indeed, we find comprehensive evidence that the accounting quality of backdating 
firms is lower than the quality of firms that have not engaged in backdating. Our 
matched-sample  tests  enable  us  to  discount  potential  competing  explanations  for 
differences in accounting quality that do not refer to personal characteristics of top 
management.   
When  we  measure  accounting  quality  using  seven  earnings  attributes  as 
described in Francis et al. (2004), we do not find consistent results regarding the 
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quality on one attribute with higher quality on another and use this balancing strategy 
to direct away investors’ scrutiny. Though the results from our diagnostic tests are 
much less ambiguous, we also find some evidence to support our conjecture. For 
example, most of our sample firms are in high-tech industry; spending on Research & 
Development might be a focus of attention of investors. Indeed, we find backdating 
firms, on average, spend more on Research & Development in percentage of their 
sales than their peers.  
 
3.6 Discussion, limitations, and concluding comments 
  Our investigation of the reporting behavior of backdating firms is motivated 
by an increasing awareness in the literature that much of the between-firm variation in 
accounting  quality  cannot  be  explained  by  fundamental  economic  factors.  We 
conjecture that personal traits of top management are a likely explanatory factor for 
discretionary reporting choices that remain unexplained by fundamentals. We find 
support  for  this  conjecture  in  an  emerging  literature  in  the  fields  of  economics, 
management, and finance as well as in a few recent accounting papers.  
  One thorny issue when exploring the role of managerial characteristics is that 
it is unclear which characteristics matter and how they can be captured empirically in 
a  fashion  that  admits  large  sample  testing.  We  propose  to  use  the  stock  option 
backdating scandal as a setting in which a considerable number of managers have 
revealed themselves as being willing to commit fraud to buttress their own financial 
interests.  
  We hypothesize that these “dishonest” managers will have few qualms about 
misleading investors through their financial statements as they have already shown 
that  they  are  willing  to  mislead  authorities  about  their  option  plans.  Thus,  more 
specifically we argue that the accounting quality of backdating firms will be lower 
than the quality of non-backdating firms. We measure accounting quality using seven 
earnings attributes as described in Francis et al. (2004). Prior research shows that 
investors care more about accounting-based earnings attributes than market-based. 
Thus, it is more costly for managers to lower the quality of accounting-based than 
market-based  attributes.  We  formalize  this  idea  in  our  second  hypothesis.  Our 
findings show significant differences between the earnings attributes of backdating 
and non-backdating firms. In contrast to our expectations, however, backdating firms 
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these firms perform more poorly on accrual quality, smoothness, and timeliness. We 
find no significant differences on value relevance. While consistent with our overall 
idea that top management characteristics matter, these findings provide only partial 
support for the first hypothesis and are inconsistent with the second hypothesis.  
  The literature has pointed out that while these earnings attributes are generally 
construed  as  measures  of  accounting  quality,  they  are  at  the  same  time  partially 
overlapping and not necessarily internally consistent. One possible explanation for our 
mixed results therefore is that there is no straightforward interpretation of earnings 
attributes as a measure of accounting quality. We therefore propose to rely on a more 
traditional approach of evaluating accounting quality, i.e., to use financial statement 
analysis. Thus, we compute ratios that have been identified as quality diagnostics and 
compare the scores for backdating firms with their closest competitor. We show that 
backdating firms are more aggressively booking sales, have low expenditures relative 
to  their  sales  activity,  and  (consequently)  higher  profit  margin  and  lower  asset 
turnover. Thus, the financial statement analysis yields the unambiguous judgment that 
the accounting quality of backdating firms is lower than that of their peers. Under our 
hypothesis, we ascribe this difference to the revealed type of the top management of 
backdating firms.  
  Our conclusions about the influence of managerial type are conditional on our 
ability to control for the fundamental economic determinants of reporting behavior. 
While we follow prior literature in our regression specifications and include many 
variables that have been identified in earlier work, we cannot exclude the possibility 
that  we  have  omitted  a  significant  fundamental  factor.  Similarly,  in  our  financial 
statement  analysis  tests,  our  conclusions  rely  on  the  soundness  of  our  matching 
procedure.  We  also  concede  that  to  some  extent  our  choice  of  included  ratios  is 
arbitrary. We are limited by our intention to provide large sample evidence and data 
availability is an issue for many of the ratios that could potentially be used. We also 
must emphasize that our exercise is not by any means equivalent to a full-fledged 
fundamental analysis, if only because that would involve developing industry-specific 
ratios and examining these ratios over longer time spans.  
  Notwithstanding these issues, our study is among the first to provide evidence 
on how managerial characteristics affect accounting quality. We also show that while 
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interpretation is not obvious. We suggest that putting these attributes in the context of 
a traditional ratio-analysis might be helpful.  
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3.8 Appendix 1 Definitions of variables 
 
Part I: Variables used in empirical analysis of earnings attributes of backdating 
and non-backdating firms 
 
•  Backdating: This measure is an indicator variable which equals unity if the 
sample firm in a certain year has been identified as having backdated its stock 
options, zero otherwise. 
 
•  AccrualQuality: This measure follows the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
and defines accrual quality as the standard deviation of the residuals from a 
regression of current accruals on lagged, current, and lead cash flows from 
operations.  The  model  is  estimated  for  each  firm  using  a  rolling  6-year 
window. As discussed in Francis et al. (2004), the quality of accruals and 
earnings is decreasing in the magnitude of the estimation errors. Large (small) 
values of AccrualsQuality correspond to poor (good) accrual quality. 
 
•  Persistence: The persistence of earnings is measures the impact of current 
earnings on future earnings. Persistence is the negative of the slope coefficient 
of an auto-regressive model of order one for earnings-per-share. The model is 
estimated for each firm using a rolling 6-year window. Higher (low) values of 
Persistence represent less (more) persistent earnings.  
 
•  Predictability: This measure is the standard deviation of the residuals of an 
auto-regressive  model  of  order  one  for  earnings-per-share.  The  model  is 
estimated for each firm using a rolling 6-year window. Large (small) values of 
Predictability correspond to less (more) predictable earnings. 
 
•  Smoothness:  This  measure  is  the  standard  deviation  of  net  income  before 
extraordinary items deflated by beginning total assets divided by the standard 
deviation of the ratio of cash flow from operations deflated by beginning total 
assets to control for difference in economic performance across firms. The 
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a rolling 6-year window. Large (small) values of Smoothness correspond to 
less (more) smoothed earnings relative to cash flows.  
 
•  Relevance:    This  measure  is  computed  as  the  negative  of  the  explanatory 
power (i.e., R-square) of a regression of stock returns on levels and changes of 
earnings for each firm using a rolling 6-year window. Earnings is measured as 
net income before extraordinary items deflated by beginning market value of 
equity.  Large  (small)  values  of  Relevance  correspond  to  less  (more)  value 
relevant earnings.  
 
•  Timeliness:  This measure is the negative of the adjusted R2 from a reverse 
regression of annual earnings before extraordinary items on 15-month returns 
for each firm using a rolling 6-year window (with separate intercept and slopes 
for  negative  and  positive  return).  Large  (small)  values  of  Timeliness 
correspond to less (more) timely earnings. 
 
•  Conservatism: This measure is the negative of the ratio of the coefficient of 
bad news to the coefficient of good news in the reverse regression used for 
measuring  Timeliness.  Large  (small)  values  of  Conservatism  correspond  to 
less (more) conservative earnings. 
 
•  Size: This measure is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets.  
 
•  σ(CFO):  This variable is calculated as the standard deviation of the firm’s 
rolling 6-year cash flow from operations, scaled by total assets. 
 
•  σ(sales):  This variable is computed as the the standard deviation of the firms 
rolling 6-year sales revenues, scaled by total assets. 
 
•  OperCycle: This variable is defined as the natural logarithm of the sum of the 
firms' days accounts receivable and days inventory. A firm’s days accounts 
receivable is measured as 365 days divided by accounts receivable turnover, 
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by average accounts receivables. A firm’s days inventory is measured as 365 
days divided by inventory turnover, where inventory turnover is calculated as 
the cost of goods sold divided by average inventory.  
 
•  NegEarn: This variable is defined as the firm’s proportion of losses over the 
prior six years. 
 
•  Int_Intensity:  This  variable  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  the  firm’s  reported 
research and development (R&D) and advertising expense as a proportion to 
its sales revenues. Missing values of R&D and advertising expense are set to 
zero. 
 
•  Int_Dummy:  This variable is an indicator variable which equals one if the 
firm does not have reported intangibles (i.e., if Int_Intensity equals 0), and 
zero otherwise. 
 
•  Cap_Intensity:  This variable is defined as the ratio of the net book value of 
property, plant, and equipment to total assets. 
 
•  Indus_Dummy: This is an indicator variable which equals one if the sample 
firm belongs to a certain 2 digit industry, zero otherwise. 
 
•  G-index:  Corporate  governance  score  provided  by  Andrew  Metrick  and 
calculated as described in Gompers et al. (2003).  
 
Part II: Variables used in ratio analysis for matched samples of backdating and 
non-backdating firms 
 
•  Size: This variable is defined as the difference of the natural logarithm of 
assets between backdating and non-backdating firms. Backdating firms are the 
sample firms identified as having their stock options backdated in a certain 
year. Non-backdating firms are the matched pair for backdating firms based on 
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•  REVENUE/CASH: This variable is defined as the negative of the difference of 
sales  to  cash  flow  from  operation  between  backdating  and  non-backdating 
firms.  Holding  the  level  of  cash  flows  constant,  higher  revenues  are  more 
likely  the  outcome  of  aggressively  recognizing  sales.  Negative  (positive) 
values indicate that (non-backdating) backdating firms have lower accounting 
quality.  
 
•  REVENUE/REC:  This variable is defined as the difference of sales revenue to 
accounts receivables between backdating and non-backdating firms. If firms 
adopt more aggressive credit sale policy and underestimate returns and credit 
losses, the ratio of revenue to receivables will decrease. Negative (positive) 
values indicate that (non-backdating) backdating firms have lower accounting 
quality. 
 
•  ∆REVENUE/∆REC: This variable is defined as the difference of the change of 
sales  to  the  change  of  receivables  between  backdating  and  non-backdating 
firms. If the change in sales is lower than the change in credit sales, it is likely 
that firms adopt more aggressive credit sale policy and underestimate returns 
and  credit  losses.  Negative  (positive)  values  indicate  that  (non-backdating) 
backdating firms have lower accounting quality. 
 
•  NONINCOM: The variable is defined as the negative of the difference of non-
operating  income  between  backdating  and  non-backdating  firms.  Negative 
(positive) values indicate that (non-backdating) backdating firms have lower 
accounting quality. 
 
•  SGA/REVENUE: The variable is defined as the difference of selling, general 
and  administrative  expense  (SGA)  to  sales  between  backdating  and  non-
backdating  firms.  Negative  (positive)  values  indicate  that  (non-backdating) 
backdating firms have lower accounting quality. 
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•  PENSION/SG: The variable is defined as the difference of pension expense to 
selling, general and administrative expense (SGA) between backdating and 
non-backdating firms. Negative (positive) values indicate that (non-backdating) 
backdating firms have lower accounting quality. 
 
•  CGS/REVENUE: The variable is defined as the difference of cost of goods 
sold (CGS) to sales between backdating and non-backdating firms. CGS can 
be manipulated via inventories. For example, firms fail to write down obsolete 
inventories  Negative  (positive)  values  indicate  that  (non-backdating) 
backdating firms have lower accounting quality.. 
 
•  DA/REVENUE: This variable is defined as the difference of depreciation and 
amortization expense (DA) to sales between backdating and non-backdating 
firms.  Negative  (positive)  values  indicate  that  (non-backdating)  backdating 
firms have lower accounting quality. 
 
•  RD/REVENUE:  This  variable  is  defined  as  the  difference  of  research  and 
development expense (R&D) to sales between backdating and non-backdating 
firms.  Negative  (positive)  values  indicate  that  (non-backdating)  backdating 
firms have lower accounting quality. 
 
•  BADDEBT/REC:  This  variable  is  defined  as  the  difference  of  bad  debt 
allowance  to  accounts  receivables  between  backdating  and  non-backdating 
firms.  Negative  (positive)  values  indicate  that  (non-backdating)  backdating 
firms have lower accounting quality. 
 
•  ∆BADDEBT/∆REC: This variable is defined as the difference of the change of 
bad debt allowance to the change of accounts receivables between backdating 
and  non-backdating  firms.  Negative  (positive)  values  indicate  that  (non-
backdating) backdating firms have lower accounting quality. 
 
•  PM:  This  variable  is  defined  as  the  difference  of  profit  margin  between 
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income  divided  by  net  sales  revenues.  Positive  (negative)  values  of  PM 
indicate that backdating firms have lower (higher) accounting quality.  
 
•  ATO is defined as the difference of asset turnover between backdating and 
non-backdating firms, where asset turnover is defined as the sales revenue 
divided by net operating assets. Negative (positive) values of ATO indicate 
that backdating firms have lower (higher) accounting quality.  
 
•  ∆PM: This variable is defined as the difference of the change of the profit 
margin  between  backdating  and  non-backdating  firms.  Positive  (negative) 
values of ∆PM indicate that backdating firms have lower (higher) accounting 
quality.  
 
•  ∆ATO:  This  variable  is  defined  as  the  difference  of  the  change  in  ATO 
between  backdating  and  non-backdating  firms.  Negative  (positive)  ∆ATO 
indicate that backdating firms have lower accounting quality.  
 
•  ATO_SAMPLE  and  ATO_MATCHED:  ATO_SAMPLE  is  defined  as  the 
change of asset turnover of backdating firms. ATO_MATCHED is defined as 
the  change  of  asset  turnover  of  non-backdating  firms.  Negative  changes 
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3.9 Appendix 2 Firms involved in the stock option backdating scandal 
 
Company name  Start year  End year 
Activision Inc.  1993  2006 
Affiliated Computer Services  -Cl A  1994  2005 
Affymetrix Inc.  1997  1999 
Agile Software  1999  2003 
American Tower Corp.  2005  2006 
Amkor Technology Inc.  1998  2005 
Analog Devices  1998  2001 
Apollo Group Inc.  -Cl A  1994  2005 
Apple Computer Inc.  1997  2002 
Applied Micro Circuits Corp  1998  2002 
Applied Signal Technology  1998  2005 
Aspen Technolog  1996  2004 
Atmel Corp.  1993  2004 
Autodesk Inc.  1998  2006 
Barnes & Noble Inc.  1996  2006 
Bea Systems  1997  2006 
Bed, Bath & Beyond  1998  2004 
Biomet  1996  2006 
Black Box  1995  2002 
Blue Coat Systems Inc.  2000  2004 
Boston Communications Group  1998  2002 
Broadcom Corp.  -Cl A  1998  2003 
Brocade Communications Systems  2000  2004 
Brooks Automation Inc.  1996  2005 
Ca Inc.  1996  2006 
Cablevision Sys Corp.  -Cl A  1997  2002 
Caremark Rx Inc.  1994  2005 
Cec Entertainment Inc.  1989  2005 
Ceradyne Inc.  1997  2003 
Cheesecake Factory Inc.  2000  2006 
Children's Place  2003  2005 
Cirrus Logic Inc.  1997  2005 
Clorox Co/De  1996  2006 
Cnet Networks Inc.  2003  2005 
Computer Sciences Corp.     
Comverse Technology Inc.  1991  2002 
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Costco Wholesale  2005  2006 
Crown Castle Intl Corp.  1998  2001 
Cyberonics Inc.  1999  2003 
Delta Petroleum  1997  2004 
Dot Hill Systems Corp.  2000  2003 
Electronic Arts  1997  2006 
Emcore  2000  2003 
Endocare Inc.  1997  2002 
Engineered Support Systems  2000  2006 
Eplus Inc.  1997  2006 
Extreme Networks Inc.     
F5 Networks Inc.  1995  2006 
Forrester Research  1998  2004 
Foundry Networks Inc.  1995  2006 
Getty Images  1999  2002 
Hansen Natural     
Hcc Insurance Holdings  1995  2006 
Healthsouth Corp.  1995  2002 
Home Depot Inc.  1981  2001 
Ibasis  1999  2006 
Insight Enterprises  1996  2006 
Integrated Silicon Solution  1995  2006 
J2 Global Communications Inc.     
Jabil Circuit Inc.  1998  2001 
Juniper Networks Inc.  2003  2006 
Kb Home  1998  2005 
Keithley     
King Pharmaceuticals  2000  2001 
Kla-Tencor Corp.  1991  2005 
Kos Pharmaceuticals Inc.  2001  2003 
L-3 Communications Hldgs Inc.  1998  2006 
Marvell Technology Group Ltd.  2000  2006 
Maxim Integrated Products     
Mcafee Inc.  2000  2002 
Meade Instruments Corp.  1998  2002 
Medarex Inc.  2000  2006 
Mercury Interactive Corp.  1996  2002 
Michaels Stores Inc.  1990  2001 
Microsoft Corp.  1992  1999 
Microtune  2000  2003 Chapter 3   Top Level Executive Characteristics and Earnings Attributes                  83               
 
Mips Technologies     
Molex Inc.  1994  2006 
Monster Worldwide Inc.  1997  2001 
Msystems  2001  2005 
Newpark Resources  2001  2003 
Novell Inc.  1996  2005 
Novellus Systems Inc.  1997  2002 
Nvidia Corp.  2000  2006 
Nyfix Inc.  2000  2006 
Openwave Systems Inc.  1995  2006 
Pediatrix  1995  2001 
Pixar  1997  2001 
Pmc-Sierra Inc.  1998  2001 
Power Integrations Inc.  1999  2004 
Progress Software Corp.  1995  2002 
Quest Software Inc.  2000  2005 
Rambus Inc.  1990  2005 
Redback Networks Inc.     
Renal Care Group Inc.  1997  2002 
Research In Motion  1997  2002 
Restoration Hardware Inc.  2002  2004 
Rsa Security Inc.  1999  2005 
Safenet Inc.  2000  2006 
Sanmina-Sci Corp.  1997  2006 
Sapient  1997  2001 
Semtech Corp.  2002  2006 
Sepracor Inc.  2003  2006 
Sharper Image  2003  2005 
Sigma Designs Inc.  1994  2005 
Silicon Image  2000  2005 
Sonus Networks  2000  2003 
Stolt-Nielsen  2003  2004 
Sunrise Telecom  2001  2005 
Sun-Times Media  1999  2002 
Sycamore Networks Inc.  2000  2005 
Take-Two Interactive Software  1997  2003 
Thq Inc.  1996  2005 
Trident Microsystems Inc.  1995  2004 
Ulticom Inc.  2002  2005 
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Valeant Pharmaceuticals  1997  2006 
Verint Systems Inc.  1991  2002 
Verisign Inc.  2001  2005 
Vitesse Semiconductor Corp.  1995  2006 
Western Digital Corp.  1999  2003 
Wind River      
Witness Systems Inc.  2000  2002 
Zoran Corp.  1997  2005 
Flir Systems  1996  2001 
Altera Corp.  1996  2000 
Asyst Technologies Inc.  1997  2006 
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Chapter  4:  To  Miss  or  To  Meet  Earnings  Benchmarks? 





  Prior literature provides evidence that managers have incentives to meet or 
beat earnings benchmarks and are rewarded by markets for doing so (Lopez and Rees 
2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002). One of the reasons managers do this is that their 
compensation  is  tied  to  the  stock  price  and  they  try  to  avoid  the  negative  price 
consequence of missing earnings targets. Managers also have incentives to miss their 
earnings targets for the benefit of obtaining a lower strike price on subsequent option 
grants (McAnally et al. 2008). 
  I examine whether meeting/beating or missing earnings benchmarks is more 
pronounced  for  firms  with  managers  involved  in  the  option  backdating  scandal. 
Consistent  with  prior  literature,  I  examine  three  earnings  benchmarks:  1.  report 
positive  profits,  2.  sustain  recent  performance,  and  3.  meet  analysts'  expectations. 
Options backdating is the practice of granting employee stock options (ESO) that are 
dated prior to the date that the company actually granted the option. It is illegal in the 
sense that the grantor submitted falsified documents to investors and regulators in an 
effort  to  conceal  the  backdating.  ESOs  are  usually  granted  at-the-money,  i.e.,  the 
exercise price of the options is set to equal the market price of the underlying stock on 
the  grant  date.   Because  the  option  value  is  higher  if  the  exercise  price  is  lower, 
executives  prefer  to  be  granted  options  when  the  stock  price  is  at  its 
lowest.  Backdating allows executives to choose a past date when the market price 
was particularly low, thus inflating the value of the options. By the summer of 2007, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission as well as state and federal prosecutors had 
launched  several  investigations  into  possible  improper  backdating  of  options  and 
more than 130 listed companies are suspected of engaging in this practice. 
Controlling for operational reasons, both just meeting/beating and just missing 
earnings benchmarks can be consistent with earnings management and may entail
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negative consequences to other stakeholders. For example, some managers are willing 
to  engage  in  value-destroying  actions  in  order  to  meet/beat  earnings  benchmarks 
(Graham et al. 2005). In addition, managers who want to get a lower strike price of 
their option grant, miss earnings targets on purpose (McAnally et al. 2008), which 
may harm the current stock holders via increased perceived risk or increased cost of 
capital.  Managers who illegally backdated their stock option grants reveal by doing 
so that they are willing to mislead shareholders, tax authorities, and other stakeholders 
to the firm to obtain personal gains. I expect managers who illegally backdated their 
option grants are less concerned about negative consequences to other stakeholders in 
the company and are more likely to manage their earnings in order to meet/beat or 
miss  earnings  targets  if  they  can  gain  personal  benefits  through  such  behavior.  I 
interpret  the  difference  in  meeting/beating  earnings  benchmark  behavior  between 
backdating and non-backdating firms as evidence for my prediction that a manager’s 
type plays a significant role in earnings management.  
  Durtschi and Easton (2005; 2008) argue that the interpretation of benchmark 
beating or missing can be problematic as the empirical measures rely on scaling by 
stock price. This scaling procedure itself could be responsible for the finding in the 
extant  literature  that  more  firms  just  meet/beat  earnings  benchmarks  compared  to 
firms just missing earnings benchmarks. For instance, beginning of year prices for 
small loss firms are systematically lower than the corresponding figures for small 
profit firms. Consequently, small positive earnings are scaled closer to zero by higher 
beginning of year price; small negative earnings are scaled away from zero by lower 
beginning of year prices. The results from this paper help to shed light on the debate 
on the validity of its use as measure of earnings management for the following two 
reasons. First, in the current setting, we have strong priors that backdating managers 
are prone to manage earnings. Given these priors, finding meeting/beating behavior 
with these managers is easier to accept as earnings management. Second, I am not 
examining whether firms in general are more likely to have their earnings distributed 
above the earnings benchmarks, but I try to examine whether backdating firms are 
more  likely  to  have  their  earnings  distributed  above  the  earnings  benchmarks 
compared to non-backdating firms. This comparison may suffer less from the scaling 
problem as I am not comparing firms with small profits to firms with small losses. 
Using a sample of 63 identified backdating firms with financial information to 
conduct the tests (348 firm-year observations) and 1950 non-backdating firms (14,519 Chapter 4   To Miss or To Meet Earnings Benchmarks?                                             87               
 
firm-year  observations),  I  find  that  backdating  firms  are  more  likely  to  meet  or 
narrowly beat all three earnings benchmarks examined in the paper. At the same time, 
they are less likely to miss analysts’ forecasts. The evidence is consistent with the 
observations that managers try to meet  stakeholders’ expectations and try to avoid 
costly litigation that could potentially be triggered by unfavorable earnings surprises 
(Bartov et al. 2002). 
My  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  in  the  following  ways.    First,  the 
findings add to the earnings management literature. The results show that, not only 
incentives  matter  regarding  earnings  management  in  terms  of  meeting/beating 
behavior, but also a manager’s type plays a role. Managers who have been involved in 
backdating practices and so reveal their willingness to harm other stakeholders also 
are more prone to engage in earnings management. Second, my paper adds to the 
ongoing discussion whether earnings management is responsible for the documented 
pattern of benchmark-beating reporting behavior or whether this is due to issues of 
scaling: managers who are more likely to manage their earnings also more often show 
“suspect” benchmark missing/beating behavior. Third, the findings indirectly add to 
the current discussion on stock option backdating; I conclude that attention should not 
only be paid to the economic consequences of the stock option scandal itself, but 
attention should also be given to possible earnings management by these managers.   
 
4.2 Hypothesis development 
4.2.1 Meeting/beating earnings benchmarks 
  Prior researchers (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999) suggest 
that firms’ stakeholders, such as investors, directors, customers, and suppliers use 
earnings benchmarks as reference points or heuristics to evaluate the performance of 
firms and they find that firms have strong incentive to manage their earnings to beat 
three  earnings  benchmarks:  positive  earnings,  last  year’s  earnings,  and  analyst 
forecasts. Consistent with his conjecture that firms have increased their propensity to 
report both profits and losses that either meet or beat analyst estimates due to the 
heightened  concern  of  managers  with  litigation,  Brown  (2001)  finds  a  growing 
number of firms meeting/beating earnings benchmarks. Brown and Caylor (2005) find 
that firms earn abnormal positive returns when they report profits, quarterly earnings 
increases, or beat analyst forecasts. Daske, Gebhardt and Mcleay  (2006) find that 88                                          Essays on the Role of Managerial Type in Financial Reporting 
 
meeting/beating earnings benchmarks in the EU is even more pronounced than in the 
US. 
Previous researchers also find that markets react negatively when firms miss 
zero earnings targets, or analyst forecasts and firms manage their earnings to meet or 
beat these earnings benchmarks (Lopez and Rees 2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002). 
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005), in a survey, show that managers are willing to 
take value-destroying actions to meet and beat analyst’s earnings per share (EPS) 
targets. With capital markets sensitive to earnings benchmarks which drive the short-
term  stock  price  movement,  managers  may  manipulate  earnings  to  achieve  their 
earnings  targets  in  order  to  obtain  the  desired  price  movement  (e.g.,  Dhaliwal, 
Gleason, and Mills 2004; Graham et al. 2005; McAnally et al. 2008). 
  Managers  who  were  involved  in  backdating  scandal  reveal  themselves  as 
willing  to  mislead  stakeholders  to  the  firm  to  obtain  some  personal  benefits.  For 
example, by backdating, these managers inflate the value of options and thus increase 
their  compensation  at  the  expense  of  the  shareholders. According  to  previous 
literature, meeting/beating earnings benchmarks can bring managers higher bonuses, 
higher  equity  compensation,  and  labor-market  reputation  through  increased  stock 
prices. Managers may manipulate their earnings, at a cost to other stakeholders of the 
company, to obtain these benefits. I expect managers who illegally backdated their 
option  grants  are  less  concerned  about  the  negative  consequences  to  other 
stakeholders  in  the  company  and  these  managers  are  therefore  more  likely  to 
manipulate their earnings.  
  H1:  Just  meeting  or  beating  earnings  benchmarks  is  more  pronounced  for 
firms involved in option backdating.  
 
4.2.2 Missing earnings benchmarks 
  Prior  studies  find  that  managers  either  opportunistically  time  bad  news  or 
manage earnings downward prior to stock option grants (Aboody and Kasznik 2000; 
Chauvin and Shenoy 2001; Baker et al. 2003). Furthermore, Degeorge et al. (1999) 
argue  that  stakeholders  to  the  company  can  more  easily  detect  a  missed  earnings 
target than  general  earnings management. The  stock price reaction is likely to be 
stronger for a missed earnings target than for downward earnings management by 
other means which does not lead to missing the earnings target (Skinner and Sloan 
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price decline (Graham et al. 2005). Empirical studies support managers’ believes that 
the market reacts very negatively to firms that miss zero earnings targets or analysts’ 
forecasts (Lopez and Rees 2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002). While missing earnings 
targets  is  costly  to  shareholders,  a  missed  earnings  target  could  directly  benefit 
managers who are awarded stock-option grants after announcing earnings that are 
below  target (McAnally et al. 2008). If managers in general have incentives to miss 
earnings target in order to create bad news and enjoy the benefit from subsequent 
lower stock option grant prices, managers with backdated options certainly can be 
expected to do so. I expect to find more pronounced missing target behavior among 
managers with backdated options based on the assumption that backdating managers 
have less concern over the negative consequence of their behavior. 
  H2: Missing earnings benchmarks is more pronounced for firms involved in 
option backdating.  
 
4.2.3 Mixed strategy of meeting or missing earnings benchmarks 
  Prior research shows that whether and how to manage earnings is a strategic 
choice of managers based on the expected costs and benefits of such choices (Fields et 
al. 2001). Managers manage to meet or beat earnings benchmarks when they want to 
exercise  their  stock  options,  have  earnings  related  bonus  or  other  price-related 
incentives; these managers also have incentives to miss earnings benchmarks if they 
want to create bad news in order to get lower strike prices. Although missing an 
earnings target can be a rational executive decision, managers do not seem to adopt a 
strategy of consistently missing earnings benchmarks (McAnally et al. 2008). Instead, 
managers use mixed strategies according to their needs. Depending on the tradeoff of 
meeting/beating or missing the earnings targets, managers have incentives to choose 
either  of  the  two  kinds  of  strategies.  Both  meeting/beating  and  missing  earnings 
benchmarks can be an indicator of earnings management which may bring benefits to 
the managers and impose costs on the firm or on shareholders. I expect to find both 
forms  of  earnings  management  more  pronounced  for  managers  with  backdated 
options based on the assumption that managers use a mixed strategy of doing both. In 
other words, I expect to find a disproportionate higher number of backdating firms 
that just meet/beat or just miss earnings benchmarks.  
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4.3 Research design and sample selection 
4.3.1 Research design 
  Following prior research (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999; 
Brown 2001; Dichev and Skinner 2002; Brown and Caylor 2005; Bartov and Cohen 
2007;  McAnally  et  al.  2008),  I  use  the  following  three  proxies  for  earnings 
benchmarks:  positive  earnings,  last  year’s  earnings,  and  analyst  forecasts.  Just 
meeting/beating earnings are defined as indicator variables which equal one, if (1) 
earnings divided by lagged market value is equal to or larger than 0.00 but less than 
0.02 (JMBT1); (2) change in earnings scaled by lagged market value is equal to or 
larger than 0.00 but less than 0.02 (JMBT2); and (3) earnings per share beat or meet 
the most recent analyst forecast by less than two cents (JMBT3), and zero otherwise. 
Extant research suggests that losses have the biggest impact on stock price when the 
loss is very small (i.e., when the firm just misses reporting positive earnings) or when 
the  loss  is  very  large  (i.e.,  when  the  firms  reports  a  “big  bath”)  (Healy  1985; 
McAnally et al. 2008). Both forms of missing targets behavior are taken as earnings 
management, following McAnally et al., I label missing earnings targets as either 
when firms just miss earnings targets to a very small extent or when firms miss the 
targets  to  the  maximum  extent.  Consistent  with  the  just  meeting/beating  earnings 
benchmarks,  the  just  missing  earnings  benchmarks  are  also  defined  as  indicator 
variables which equal one, if (1) earnings divided by lagged market value is either less 
than 0.00 but greater than -0.02 or is less than 0.00 and in the lowest quartile for that 
2-digit  industry  for  that  year  (JMST1);  (2)  change  in  earnings  divided  by  lagged 
market value is either less than 0.00 but greater than -0.02 or is in the lowest quartile 
for that 2-digit industry for that year (JMST2); (3) a firm’s earnings per share either 
miss the most recent analyst forecast  by less than two cents or is in the lowest quartile 
for that industry for that year (JMST3) (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Phillips, Pincus, 
and Rego 2003; McAnally et al. 2008), and zero otherwise.  
I use the following model to test if just meet/beat or miss earnings benchmarks 
are more pronounced for backdating firms: 
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Where Meeting/missing benchmarks are two set of choices made by managers; 
Φ could be one of the following three earnings benchmarks: (1) positive earnings (2) 
last  year’s  earnings; and (3) analyst forecasts. Backdating is an indicator variable 
which equals one if the sample firm in a certain year is identified as having its stock 
options backdated, and zero otherwise. The definitions of all variables are provided in 
Appendix 1. 
The logic behind this test is that, under the null hypothesis, the cross-sectional 
distribution  of  just  meeting/missing  earnings  benchmarks  should  be  the  same  for 
backdating  and  non-backdating  firms.  If  the  frequency  of  backdating  firms 
meeting/missing earnings benchmarks is significantly higher, then there is evidence 
that backdating firms are engaged in earnings management to a greater extent.  
Since  all  dependent  variables  are  measured  in  a  binary  form,  logistic 
regressions  are  used  to  estimate  the  probability  that  a  firm  meets/beats  or  misses 
earnings benchmarks. A positive (negative) regression coefficient of an independent 
variable  means  that  this  factor  (independent  variable)  increases  (decreases)  the 
probabilities  of  a  firm  to  meet/beat  or  to  miss  earnings  benchmarks.  To  address 
potential time-series and cross-sectional dependence, standard errors are clustered at 
both the firm and year level (Petersen 2008).  
To test the hypotheses, I estimate six equations using JMBT1, JMBT2, JMBT3, 
JMST1, JMST2, and JMST3 as dependent variables; the backdating indicator variable 
is  the  explanatory  variable  of  interest.  If  meeting/beating  or  missing  earnings 
benchmarks is more pronounced for firms involved in option backdating scandal, I 
expect the coefficient on Backdating to be positive.  
Control variables 
Control variables are based on earlier work and include proxies for executive 
compensation incentives, firm characteristics, and the regulation environment.  
Prior research finds that performance-based compensation creates incentives 
for  managers  to  choose  different  reporting  strategies:  managers  with  high  equity 
incentives (option grants, un-exercisable options, exercisable options, restricted stock 
grants and stock ownership) are more likely to manage earnings upward (Baker et al. 
2003; Bartov and Mohanram 2004; McVay, Nagar, and Tang 2006; Meek, Rao, and 
Skousen 2007) and to meet or beat earnings benchmarks (Cheng and Warfield 2005); 
managers with bonus pay can have incentives to manage earnings upward or manage 
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(Healy 1985). I expect a negative association between missed earnings targets and 
these CEO compensation incentives. I have no signed prediction for the coefficients 
on these CEO compensation incentives in just meet/beat equations. Managers have 
incentives to manage earnings upward to the maximum extent in order to maximize 
his bonus payoff or equity-based compensation instead of to just beat or meet earnings 
benchmarks.  If  this  is  true,  the  association  between  incentive  compensation  and 
meeting/beating earnings benchmarks can be positive for just meeting/beating firms 
and  negative  for  firms  meeting/beating  earnings  benchmarks  to  a  larger  extent. 
McAnally et al. (2008) show that managers also have incentives to miss their earnings 
targets for the benefit of lower strike price on subsequent option grants. I included in 
the regression a dummy variable which equals one if there are subsequent option 
grants three months after the earnings announcement, and zero otherwise. To control 
for the influence of the size of the option grant, I also include the option grant value in 
the regression.  
I  control  for  other  firm  level  characteristics  which  influence  managerial 
reporting behavior. Leverage is included for the reason that managers have incentives 
to manage earnings to avoid debt-covenant violation (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994) 
and because beating earnings benchmarks lowers the cost of debt (Jiang 2008). Size, 
measured as the natural logarithm of assets, firm performance, measured as return on 
asset, and growth options, measured as market to book ratio, are included to allow for 
operational causes of differences in meeting/beating targets. In the analyst forecast 
benchmark equation, both forecast error and analyst following are included as extra 
control variables since both are found to be correlated with forecast bias in the sense 
that analysts might issue optimistic forecasts to gain increased access to information 
from  management  and  a  greater  analyst  following  can  lead  to  more  intense 
competition among analysts to issue more optimistic forecasts (Bhushan 1989; Bartov 
et al. 2002). Forecast error is measured as the difference of actual earnings per share 
and  the  first  analyst’s  forecast.  Number  of  analyst  following  is  measured  as  the 
average number of analyst following the company through the sample year.  
Finally, I also control for the change of the regulation environment which may 
influence managers’ reporting behavior.  Bartov and Cohen (2007) and Cohen et al. 
(2008) argue that the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 changed the 
financial  reporting  environment  significantly,  in  particular  with  respect  to  auditor 
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potentially  limit  earnings  management  and  they  find  evidence  that  there  is  less 
accrual-based  earnings  management  but  more  real  earnings  management  after  the 
SOX. Since the net effect of less accrual-based earnings management and more real 
earnings management is unknown, I do not have a signed prediction on the effect of 
the passage of SOX on managers’ meeting/beating or missing reporting behavior.   
4.3.2 Sample selection 
I use a list of companies that have disclosed government probes, misdated 
options,  restatements,  and/or  executive  departures  provided  by  The  Wall  Street 
Journal Online as the source for firms that are under scrutiny for possible option 
backdating.  The  sample  time  period  is  from  1992  to  2006.
33   I  verify  when  the 
company is suspected to have its first backdated options as well the time period over 
which backdating (allegedly) occurred (see Appendix 2 for the full list of companies 
which are involved in the backdating). To be included in the final sample, I require 
firms to have available financial data, compensation data, and analyst forecast data 
and to survive the outlier deletion process.   
I use the I/B/E/S detail history file to get the earnings forecasts and actual 
earnings  numbers  unadjusted  for  stock  splits.
34 All  compensation  data  are  from 
Execucomp. I compute all other firm level variables using data from the Compustat 
and  CRSP.  Consistent  with  prior  research,  observations  from  public  utility  and 
financial  service  industries  are  excluded  (two-digit  SIC  codes  49  and  60-69).  To 
mitigate the influence of extreme observations, I delete all continuous variables at the 
top and bottom one percent. The main analysis is based on the sample of 14,867 firm-
year observations which consists of 63 backdating firms (348 firm-year observations) 
and 1,950 non-backdating firms (14519 firm-year observations). Table 1 presents the 
year-by-year distribution of backdating and non-backdating firms included in the final 




                                                       
33 All compensation data for CEOs which are required for my analysis are available from 1992. The 
first  recorded  backdating  is  in  1981.  WSJ  online  reports  backdating  for  6  firms  (21  firm-year 
observations) before 1992.  
34 To address the concern that the estimates and actual values may be based on different numbers of 
shares outstanding due to stock split, I follow the methodology by Robinson and Glushkov (2006), 
using the split date provided by financial analysts, to merge the unadjusted data with the adjusted data, 
and then backing out the split factor to make sure that the estimates and actual values are based on the 
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4.4 Empirical findings 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A, Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the just meeting/beating 
or missing earnings benchmark measures, CEO compensation, and other firm-level 
characteristics for non-backdating and backdating sample firms, respectively. Panel B 
presents  the  results  of  t-tests  of  the  mean  and  Wilcoxon  signed  rank  tests  of  the 








Year  # Non-backdating firms  # Backdating firms  Total 
1992  240  0  240 
1993  652  3  655 
1994  972  7  979 
1995  1084  9  1093 
1996  1111  16  1127 
1997  1086  26  1112 
1998  1105  33  1138 
1999  1127  38  1165 
2000  1007  38  1045 
2001  1009  44  1053 
2002  1036  36  1072 
2003  1091  34  1125 
2004  1100  37  1137 
2005  1070  27  1097 
2006  829  0  829 
Total   14519  348  14867 
 
Compared to the non-backdating firm sample, the average percentage of firms 
which  just  meet/beat  all  the  three  earnings  benchmarks  is  significantly  higher  for 
backdating firms at the 5 percent level or better (mean percentages 0.158 vs. 0.116, 
0.216  vs.  0.172,  0.454  vs.  0.326).  There  is  no  consistent  difference  between 
Table 1 
Sample Composition 
This table presents the year-by-year distribution of backdating and non-backdating firms 
included in the final sample for the main tests. Final sample excludes all firms in utility and 
financial  industry.  Firms  included  in  the  final  sample  need  to  have  accounting  data, 
compensation data in Compustat and analyst forecast data in IBES. Furthermore, to control 
for outliers, the top and bottom 1 percent of observations for all continuous variables are 
deleted. The sample period is from 1992 to 2006. The final sample consists of 63 backdating 
firms and 1950 non-backdating firms.                                                             
                                                           











  Panel A: Descriptive statistics for non-backdating and backdating firms  Panel B: Mean and median test 
Non-backdating firms  Backdating firms    T-test (Mean) Wilcoxon  test (Median) 
Varname  Mean  Std  P10  P25  Median  P75  P90  N  Mean  Std  P10  P25  Median  P75  P90  N  T-value  Probt  Z-value  Probt 
JMBT1  0.116  0.320  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  14519  0.158  0.365  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  348  -2.399  0.016  -2.399  0.016 
JMBT2  0.172  0.377  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  14519  0.216  0.412  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  348  -2.133  0.033  -2.133  0.033 
JMBT3  0.326  0.469  0.000 0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  14519  0.454  0.499  0.000 0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  348  -5.019  0.000  -5.015  0.000 
JMST1  0.253  0.435  0.000 0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  14519  0.247  0.432  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  348  0.234  0.815  0.234  0.815 
JMST2  0.412  0.492  0.000 0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  14519  0.448  0.498  0.000 0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  348  -1.340  0.180  -1.340  0.180 
JMST3  0.285  0.451  0.000 0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  14519  0.193  0.395  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  348  3.777  0.000  3.775  0.000 
SOXpost  0.342  0.474  0.000 0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  14519  0.353  0.479  0.000 0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  348  -0.460  0.646  -0.460  0.646 
Grantafter  0.265  0.441  0.000 0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  14519  0.244  0.430  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  348  0.871  0.384  0.871  0.384 
Grantv  2.628  4.626  0.000 0.000  1.126  3.008  6.628  13861  5.484  6.701  0.000 0.000  3.681  8.237  13.306 347 -11.211  0.000  -5.815  0.000 
Exercise  1.926  5.321  0.000 0.000  0.000  1.007  5.653  14433  4.428  8.883  0.000 0.000  0.000  5.369  15.738 348  -8.491  0.000  -1.294  0.196 
Options  13.013 25.794 0.000 0.577  4.169  13.680 33.691 14433 33.007 46.034 0.000 1.217 16.203 42.055 92.040 348 -13.936  0.000  -6.294  0.000 
Bonus  0.812  0.826  0.000 0.167  0.661  1.144  1.783  14437  0.892  1.036  0.000 0.029  0.664  1.174  2.084  348  -1.777  0.076  -0.218  0.827 
Stock  1.888  10.439 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  14429  0.650  7.897  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  348  2.197  0.028  3.797  0.000 
Size  7.162  1.431  5.397 6.106  7.010  8.084  9.250  14513  7.015  1.201  5.422 6.181  7.018  7.798  8.662  348  1.894  0.058  -0.001  0.999 
MB  3.133  2.615  1.115 1.619  2.420  3.732  5.855  14500  4.208  3.041  1.558 2.255  3.332  5.130  8.357  348  -7.552  0.000  -7.811  0.000 
Leverage  0.217  0.160  0.000 0.077  0.212  0.328  0.430  14468  0.138  0.147  0.000 0.001  0.084  0.259  0.350  340  9.021  0.000  6.364  0.000 
ROA  0.047  0.080  -0.024 0.021  0.053  0.088  0.126  14511  0.050  0.111  -0.055 0.028  0.072  0.111  0.144  348  -0.774  0.439  -4.558  0.000 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics on just Meeting/Beating or Missing Earning Benchmark Measures, CEO Compensation and Other Firm Level 
Characteristics of Backdating and Non-backdating Firms 
Panel  A  presents  the  distribution  of  six  meeting  and  missing  earnings  benchmark  measures,  scaled  CEO  compensation  and  other  firm-level 
characteristics (refer to Appendix 1 for variable definitions) for non-backdating and backdating firms. The columns present summary statistics calculated 
across all available firm-years.  
 
Panel B presents the results of t-tests of the mean and Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the median for the same set of variables between non-backdating and 
backdating firms. Statistics for t-test is based on the assumption that variance of the variables is the same across non-backdating and backdating firms. 
Reported p-values are highlighted by using bold and italics when significant (p-value<10 percent), All p-values are from two-tailed tests.  96                                  Essays on the Role of Managerial Type in Financial Reporting                                                
  
backdating  and  non-backdating  firms  regarding  missing  earnings  benchmark 
measures. If anything, compared to non-backdating firms, backdating firms are on 
average less likely to just miss analyst forecasts (mean percentage 0.193 vs. 0.285, 
p<0.001). The two groups do not differ in just missing positive earnings and last year 
earnings.  Although  backdating  firms  are  slightly  larger  than  non-backdating  firms 
(mean  size  7.162  vs.  7.015,  p=0.058),  they  do  not  differ  with  regard  to  their 
profitability (mean ROA 0.050 vs. 0.047, p=0.439). Backdating firms have higher 
market to book ratio (MB) (mean value 4.028 vs. 3.133, p<0.001) but lower leverage 
 (Leverage) compared to non-backdating firms (mean value 0.138 vs. 0.217, p<0.001).  
On average, backdating firms do not differ much with respect to granting their 
managers options within three months after earnings announcement (mean percentage 
equals  0.244  and  0.265,  p=0.384).  But  overall,  the  compensation  structure  of 
managers from the two samples appears to be different. Note that all compensation 
variables are scaled by the manager’s fixed salary. Managers of backdating firms are 
granted more options (5.484 vs. 2.628, p<0.001) and hold more options (33.007 vs. 
13.013, p<0.001) compared with their peers from the non-backdating sample. Another 
noticeable  difference  is  the  use  of  stocks  in  their  compensation  package.  The 
managers of backdating firms, on average, receive fewer stocks than the managers of 
non-backdating  firms  (0.650  vs.  1.888,  p=0.028).  Managers  of  backdating  firms 
receive more bonus pay (mean value 0.892 vs. 0.812, p=0.076). To further illustrate 
the difference in compensation structure of CEOs of backdating and non-backdating 
firms, I also report (un-scaled) dollar compensation for these two groups (descriptive 
statistics are not tabulated). On average, backdating managers receive higher total 
compensation ($4642.58 vs. $3537.38 in thousands), receive more options ($3110.06 
vs. $1652.14 in thousands), hold more options ($18797.22 vs. $8260.79 in thousands), 
exercise more options in the year ($2570.89 vs. $1209.06 in thousands), receive less 
salary ($543.76 vs. $608.74 in thousands), have lower bonuses ($517.44 vs. $547.09 
in thousands) and hold fewer shares ($844.95 vs. $1335.51 in thousands).  
Table  3  presents  the  Pearson  correlations  for  the  six  earnings  benchmark 
measures, CEO compensation, other firm-level characteristics, and the key variable of 
interest,  Backdating.  The  correlations  between  Backdating  and  the  three  just 
meeting/beating  earnings  benchmark  measures  (JMBT1,  JMBT2  and  JMBT3)  are 
positively associated at the 5 percent level or better. At the same time, Backdating is 
negatively  correlated  with  one  of  the  three  just  missing  earnings  benchmarks                                                                                                            






     Backdating JMBT1  JMBT2  JMBT3  JMST1  JMST2  JMST3  SOXpost Grantafter Grantv Exercise Options Bonus Stock  Size  MB  leverage ROA 
Backdating  1.000                                   
                                     
JMBT1  0.020  1.000                                 
  0.016                                   
JMBT2  0.017  -0.058  1.000                               
  0.033  0.000                                 
JMBT3  0.041  0.024  0.047  1.000                             
  0.000  0.004  0.000                               
JMST1  -0.002  0.167  -0.144  -0.062  1.000                           
  0.815  0.000  0.000  0.000                             
JMST2  0.011  0.063  -0.374  -0.006  0.280  1.000                         
  0.180  0.000  0.000  0.439  0.000                           
JMST3  -0.031  0.004  -0.033  -0.322  0.122  0.049  1.000                       
  0.000  0.620  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000                         
SOXpost  0.004  -0.075  0.099  -0.015  0.005  0.016  -0.014  1.000                     
  0.646  0.000  0.000  0.064  0.564  0.049  0.082                       
Grantafter  -0.007  -0.001  0.022  0.012  -0.005  0.005  -0.013  -0.023  1.000                   
  0.384  0.910  0.008  0.143  0.568  0.547  0.111  0.005                     
Grantv  0.094  0.036  0.011  0.049  0.016  0.032  -0.038  0.002  0.070  1.000                 
  0.000  0.000  0.184  0.000  0.055  0.000  0.000  0.843  0.000                   
Exercise  0.070  -0.010  0.035  0.036  -0.084  0.000  -0.041  0.063  0.008  0.217  1.000               
  0.000  0.239  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.981  0.000  0.000  0.349  0.000                 
Options  0.114  -0.011  0.052  0.077  -0.096  0.006  -0.075  0.016  0.004  0.324  0.418  1.000             
  0.000  0.191  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.472  0.000  0.059  0.666  0.000  0.000               
Table 3 
Pearson Correlations between Variables 
This table presents Pearson correlations between six earnings benchmark measures, CEO compensation and other firm-level characteristics. 
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Bonus  0.015  -0.084  0.049  0.001  -0.203  -0.057  -0.093  0.076  0.045  0.156  0.166  0.243  1.000          
  0.076  0.000  0.000  0.880  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000             
Stock  -0.018  -0.017  0.036  -0.018  -0.015  -0.006  -0.005  0.120  -0.063  -0.016  0.028  0.021  -0.077 1.000         
  0.028  0.036  0.000  0.028  0.067  0.485  0.546  0.000  0.000  0.064  0.001  0.009  0.000           
Size  -0.016  -0.138  0.075  -0.047  -0.112  0.007  -0.010  0.099  0.100  0.134  0.060  0.134  0.271  0.070  1.000      
  0.058  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.421  0.221  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000         
MB  0.062  0.011  0.079  0.112  -0.100  0.019  -0.065  -0.046  0.027  0.196  0.226  0.386  0.142  0.012  0.032  1.000    
  0.000  0.194  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.023  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.147  0.000      
Leverage  -0.074  -0.056  -0.069  -0.068  0.079  0.011  0.055  -0.080  0.003  -0.071  -0.116  -0.110  0.004  0.001  0.327  -0.081  1.000   
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.185  0.000  0.000  0.704  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.605  0.927  0.000  0.000     
ROA  0.006  -0.010  0.155  0.099  -0.531  -0.172  -0.118  -0.034  0.007  -0.007  0.161  0.163  0.225  0.050  0.022  0.288  -0.242  1.000 
   0.439  0.243  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.398  0.398  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.006  0.000  0.000   
  Backdating  JMBT1  JMBT2  JMBT3  JMST1  JMST2  JMST3 SOXpost Grantafter Grantv Exercise Options Bonus Stock  Size  MB  leverage  ROA 
 
 Chapter 4   To Miss or To Meet Earnings Benchmarks?                                               99 
                                    
                         
measures at the 1 percent level, namely, JMST3, but has no correlation with the other 
two  just  missing  earnings  benchmark  measures  (JMST1  and  JMST2).  These 
correlations  provide  first  evidence  that  backdating  firms  have  different  reporting 
strategies on meeting/beating and missing earnings benchmarks. Consistent with H1, 
backdating firms are more likely to just meet or beat all three earnings benchmarks; in 
contrast to H2, backdating firms  are less likely to miss analysts’ forecasts (JMST3). 
The high correlations between the six meet/beat or miss earnings benchmarks with the 
compensation incentive variables and firm characteristic variables are in line with prior 
evidence that both incentives and company fundamental economic factors influence 
managers’ meeting/beating or missing earnings benchmark behavior. 
4.4.2 Main findings 
  Table 4 presents my main findings. Hypothesis H1 states that the just meeting 
or beating earnings benchmarks is more pronounced for firms involved in the option 
backdating scandal. I find strong evidence supporting this hypothesis. The coefficient 
of Backdating is significantly positive in all three meeting/beating earnings benchmark 
equations:  coefficient=0.265,  p-value  =0.052  for  the  JMBT1  equation; 
coefficient=0.195,  p-value=0.016  for  the  JMBT2  equation;  coefficient=0.276,  p-
value=0.062  for  the  JMBT3  equation.  However,  the  results  are  not  consistent  with 
hypothesis H2, in which I expect that missing earnings benchmarks is more pronounced 
for firms involved in option backdating. Indeed, in contrast to my expectation, I find 
the coefficient on Backdating is significantly negative in the JMST3 equation, which 
implies  that  backdating  firms  are  less  likely  to  just  miss  analysts’  forecast.  The 
coefficients on Backdating are not significantly different from zero for the JMST1 and 
JMST2 equations, which imply that there is no difference between these two groups in 
terms of reporting strategy of just missing positive earnings and sustaining last year’s 
performance.  
  Consistent  with  prior  findings,  executive  compensation,  firm  characteristics, 
and the regulation environment indeed affect managers’ reporting strategies. Bonus is 
significantly negative in all six equations, which may imply that to get higher bonus, 
managers  have  incentives  to  continuously  increase  their  earnings  instead  of  having 
earnings reported around zero profit. The other compensation variables are significant 
in  some  equations.  Whereas  McAnally  et  al.  (2008)  find  firms  that  miss  earnings 
targets have larger and more valuable subsequent grants for their CEOs, I do not find 
that granting options within three months after earnings announcement (Grantafter) Essays on the Role of Managerial Type in Financial Reporting                                                                                                                              100 
                                    












Dependent  Intercept  Backdating  SOXpost  Grantafter  Grantv  Exercise  Options  Bonus  Stocks  Size  MB  Leverage  ROA  Ferror  Nest 
JMBT1  0.165  0.265  -0.379  0.044  0.035  -0.002  0.000  -0.305  0.004  -0.280  0.007  -0.263  0.236     
  0.740  0.052  0.017  0.306  0.000  0.782  0.752  0.000  0.299  0.000  0.741  0.415  0.684     
JMBT2  -3.273  0.195  0.511  0.101  -0.006  -0.007  0.001  -0.071  -0.001  0.170  0.014  -0.665  7.122     
  0.000  0.016  0.000  0.089  0.229  0.246  0.637  0.014  0.772  0.000  0.226  0.007  0.000     
JMBT3  -0.156  0.276  0.056  0.041  0.010  -0.007  0.003  -0.075  0.001  -0.164  0.049  -0.003  2.050  0.124  0.042 
  0.380  0.062  0.662  0.491  0.091  0.258  0.021  0.008  0.826  0.000  0.000  0.991  0.000  0.153  0.000 
JMST1  1.380  -0.103  -0.076  0.098  0.005  0.005  -0.003  -0.211  0.008  -0.191  0.119  -0.782  -30.147     
  0.001  0.568  0.512  0.103  0.336  0.636  0.017  0.000  0.058  0.000  0.000  0.015  0.000     
JMST2  -0.454  0.055  0.071  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.000  -0.107  0.003  0.042  0.058  -0.447  -5.226     
  0.002  0.697  0.642  0.921  0.147  0.031  0.791  0.001  0.243  0.024  0.000  0.006  0.000     
JMST3  -0.961  -0.366  0.071  -0.059  -0.005  0.000  -0.003  -0.119  0.001  0.019  -0.002  0.018  -1.393  -4.831  -0.009 
   0.000  0.004  0.238  0.260  0.387  0.998  0.062  0.001  0.629  0.406  0.833  0.893  0.000  0.000  0.097 




Pooled Logistic Regressions of Meeting/Missing Earnings Benchmarks on Stock Option Backdating Status and Other Control Variables 
The table presents pooled logistic regressions of each of the six meeting/missing earnings benchmarks on an indicator variable (1=backdating firm, 
0=otherwise) and other control variables. For the analyst forecast (JMBT3 and JMST3) equations, forecast error and number of analyst following are 
included as extra control variable. P-values below the estimated coefficients are based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year level. 
Significant coefficients (p-value<10 percent) are highlighted by using bold and italics. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Where just meet (beat)/miss benchmarks are two set of choices made by managers; Φ could be one of the following three earnings 
benchmarks: (1) positive earnings (2) last year’s earnings; and (3) analyst forecasts. 
  













Dependent  Intercept  Backdating  SOXpost  Grantafter  Grantv  Exercise  Options  Bonus  Stocks  Size  MB  Leverage  ROA  Ferror  Nest 
JMBT1  0.081   0.252   -0.296   0.067   0.030   0.003   0.000   -0.257   0.003   -0.276   0.001   -0.333   1.421      
  0.857   0.015   0.068   0.325   0.000   0.559   0.703   0.001   0.292   0.000   0.970   0.407   0.011      
JMBT2  -3.324   0.272   0.585   0.074   -0.006   0.000   0.000   -0.075   -0.001   0.168   0.006   -0.555   7.086      
  0.000   0.007   0.000   0.209   0.213   0.933   0.891   0.106   0.834   0.000   0.625   0.011   0.000      
JMBT3  -0.317   0.247   0.057   0.012   0.006   -0.003   0.001   -0.089   -0.002   -0.097   0.038   -0.161   1.848   0.046   0.029  
  0.096   0.084   0.666   0.878   0.197   0.531   0.257   0.019   0.553   0.004   0.004   0.505   0.000   0.838   0.002  
JMST1  1.763   0.017   -0.174   0.004   0.004   -0.002   -0.001   -0.137   0.007   -0.238   0.079   -1.016   -31.038      
  0.004   0.932   0.185   0.956   0.624   0.769   0.356   0.024   0.136   0.001   0.006   0.011   0.000      
JMST2  -0.242   0.006   0.013   0.011   0.004   0.003   0.001   -0.083   0.004   0.000   0.050   -0.158   -4.453      
  0.017   0.962   0.933   0.885   0.257   0.342   0.429   0.014   0.158   0.988   0.000   0.271   0.000      
JMST3  -1.064   -0.352   0.066   -0.038   -0.009   0.000   -0.002   -0.103   -0.001   0.031   -0.019   -0.036   -1.268   -6.751   -0.006  
    0.000   0.008   0.268   0.578   0.202   0.969   0.237   0.019   0.745   0.352   0.223   0.843   0.000   0.000   0.401  
Table 5 
Pooled Logistic Regressions of Meeting/Missing Earnings Benchmarks on Stock Option Backdating Status and Other Control Variables 
in a Sample of Firms Matched on Industry 
The table presents pooled logistic regressions of each of the six meeting/missing earnings benchmarks on an indicator variable (1=backdating 
firm, 0=otherwise) and other control variables. For the analyst forecast (JMBT3 and JMST3) equations, forecast error and number of analyst 
following are included as extra control variables. P-values below the estimated coefficients are based on standard errors clustered at the firm and 
year level. Significant coefficients (p-value<10 percent) are highlighted by using bold and italics. Variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
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Where Meeting/missing benchmarks are two set of choices made by managers; Φ could be one of the following three earnings 
benchmarks: (1) positive earnings (2) last year’s earnings; and (3) analyst forecasts. 
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influences managers’ reporting strategies. The exceptions are in the JMBT2 and JMST1 
equations, in which the coefficients on Grantafter are marginally positively significant 
at the 10 percent level. Moreover and again, in contrast to the evidence by McAnally et 
al. that the greater value of option grants subsequent to an earnings announcement, the 
more likely that managers will miss the earnings benchmarks, I find that managers are 
more  likely  to  meet  or  beat  earnings  benchmarks:  option  grant  value  (Grantv)  is 
significantly positive in the JMBT1 and JMBT3 equations (coefficient=0.035 and 0.014, 
p-value=0.010 and 0.091 respectively).  
The results show that firms’ economic fundamentals also contribute to firms’ 
meeting/beating or missing earnings benchmark behavior. MB, Leverage, and ROA are 
significant in at least three out of six equations while Size is significant in five out of 
six equations. Finally, the effect of SOX is only significant in two out of six equations 
and the evidence is mixed. The coefficient on SOX is negative for the JMBT1 equation 
and is positive for the JMBT2 equation (coefficient= -0.379 and 0.511, p-value=0.017 
and 0.000 respectively).  
4.4.3 Additional analysis 
 
Industry matched sample 
As  there  is  substantial  clustering  of  backdating  firms  in  some  industries, 
concerns can be raised about the appropriateness of using the Compustat universe as a 
benchmark. I therefore estimate Equation (1) again in a sample of firms that consists 
only of those 2-digit SIC industries that contain backdating firms. This sample selection 
criterion reduces the sample size used in the main tests by about 40 percent.  After 
deleting top and bottom one percent of outliers for all continuous variables, the final 
sample consists of 8,723 non-backdating firm-years and 373 backdating firm-years. 
Results are presented in Table 5. As before, I cluster standard errors at both the firm 
and year level. My results are consistent with those reported in Table 4. Backdating 
firms are more pronounced in meeting/beating earnings benchmarks and less likely to 
miss analysts’ forecasted earnings.  
 
Sub-sample of profitable and loss firms 
 Durtschi and Easton (2005) observe that beginning of year prices for small loss 
firms are systematically lower than the corresponding figures for small profit firms and 
this could induce the observed discontinuities in scaled earnings (i.e., fewer number of Chapter 4   To Miss or To Meet Earnings Benchmarks?                                             103 
 
firms  which  just  miss  zero  earnings  than  firms  just  meet  or  beat  zero  earnings).  I 
estimate equation (1) again using two sub- sample of firms that either consists of only 
profitable firms (ROA>=0) or consists of only loss making firms (ROA<0). The sample 
consists of 12,795 profitable firm-years (12,508 non-backdating firm-years and 287 
backdating firm-years) and 2,560 loss firm-years (2,483 non-backdating firm-years and 
77 backdating firm-years). I rerun the three meeting/beating equations using profitable 
sample firms and I rerun the three missing equations using loss making sample firms 
and I also cluster standard errors at both the firm and year level. The results are highly 
consistent with those reported in Table 4 (results are not tabulated); more importantly, 
the coefficients on Backdating remain unchanged in terms statistical significance.  
 
Alternative earnings benchmark measures 
I rerun equation (1) using different measures of just meeting/beating or missing 
earnings  benchmark  variable.  For  example,  I  define  just  meeting/beating  earnings 
benchmarks as earnings scaled by beginning of year market value larger than zero but 
smaller  than  3  percent  rather  than  2  percent;  meeting/beating  financial  analysts’ 
forecast by 3 cents rather than 2 cents. Just missing earnings benchmarks are defined as 
earnings scaled by beginning of year market value smaller than zero but larger than 
minus 3 percent; missing financial analysts’ forecast by 3 cents rather than 2 cents. The 
original inferences remain valid (results are not tabulated). I also use total assets instead 
of market value of the firm to scale earnings, the inferences are not changed (results are 
not tabulated).  
 
Quarterly data analysis 
Prior  work  uses  either  annual  data  or  quarterly  data  to  examine  firms’ 
meeting/beating or missing earnings targets reporting behavior for different research 
purposes.  Authors  who    address  compensation  incentives  or  other  annual  based 
incentives  (e.g.,  income  taxes)  usually  rely  on  annual  data  since  compensation  for 
managers are not available on the quarterly basis and managers are often rewarded 
based on annual performance (e.g., Phillips et al. 2003; Cheng and Warfield 2005; 
McAnally  et  al.  2008;  Cohen  et  al.  2008).  Studies  that  do  not  need  to  address 
compensation  incentives  often  employ  quarterly  data  (e.g.,  Degeorge  et  al.  1999; 
Bartov et al. 2002; e.g., Brown and Caylor 2005; Bartov and Cohen 2007). Following 
the convention in prior work, given my research question and design, I use annual data 104                                  Essays on the Role of Managerial Type in Financial Reporting 
 
in the main analysis. However, to see whether the phenomenon I document is mainly 
annual and not quarterly, I rerun equation (1) with quarterly data keeping all annual 
compensation  figures  in  the  regression  (results  unreported).  The  results  show  that 
backdating  firms  do  not  differ  significantly  from  other  firms  in  meeting/beating 
quarterly positive earnings and last quarter’s earnings. Their attention is focused more 
on meeting/beating financial analysts’ forecasts. For the three missing earnings target 
equations, the results are the same with those reported in Table 4.  The results are not 
surprising  in  the  sense  that,  since  mid-1990s,  investor  reactions  to  meeting/beating 
(miss) analysts’ forecasts are larger than to meeting/beating other earnings benchmarks 
(Brown  and  Caylor  2005).  As  a  result,  firms  may  shift  their  attention  from 
meeting/beating  quarterly  positive  or  last  quarter’s  earnings  to  meeting/beating  the 
expectations formed by analysts. Furthermore, the results are also consistent with the 
prior  research  that  firms  are  particularly  concerned  whether  the  annual  reported 
earnings are positive and exceed last year’s earnings since managers’ compensation 
schemes, regulatory requirements, and bond covenants are usually based on annual 
earning figures; therefore firms often use their final fiscal quarter to meet these annual 
earnings targets rather than manipulate earnings numbers in every quarter (Das  and 
Shroff 2002; Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Jacob and Jorgensen 2007; Kerstein and Rai 2007). 
In sum, the evidence is consistent with the idea that positive earnings and sustaining 
recent earnings performance benchmarks are mostly important on an annual basis. For 
quarterly reporting, analyst forecasts continue to be important.  
 
4.5 Discussion, limitations, and conclusions 
  According to the prior literature, managers have incentives to just meet/beat 
some  earnings  benchmarks  and  they  also  have  incentives  to  just  miss  earnings 
benchmarks  (McAnally  et al. 2008). Controlling  for  economic  fundamental factors, 
both reporting behaviors are considered as earnings management. Prior literature shows 
that  both  the  compensation  incentives  of  managers  and  firm  characteristics  are 
associated  with  just  meeting/beating  or  missing  earnings  benchmark  behaviors.  I 
predict  that,  in  addition  to  compensation  incentives  and  firm  characteristics,  a 
manager’s type also plays a significant role in explaining meeting/beating or missing 
earnings  benchmarks.  I  empirically  test  my  conjecture  using  the  stock  option 
backdating  scandal  as  a  setting  in  which  a  considerable  number  of  managers  have 
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the expense of the stakeholders of the company. I examine whether meeting/beating or 
missing earnings benchmarks is more pronounced for firms with managers involved in 
option backdating. I argue that managers involved in backdating are less concerned 
about the negative consequences of their actions on other stakeholders of the company 
and are more likely to manage their earnings in order to meet/beat or miss earnings 
target. Consistent with my first hypothesis, the results show that managers involved in 
backdating are more likely to meet or narrowly beat the target of positive earnings, 
prior  year  earnings,  and  financial  analysts’  forecasts.  In  contrast  to  my  second 
hypothesis,  managers  involved  in  backdating  are  less  likely  to  just  miss  analysts’ 
forecasts. Putting the evidence together, a manager’s type does play a role in earnings 
management  in  terms  of  just  meeting/beating  or  missing  behavior,  but  it  is  less 
beneficial for backdating managers to use a missing earnings benchmark strategy to 
obtain  the  gain  of  a  lower  strike  price  on  subsequent  option  grants.  This  is  not 
completely  surprising  as  backdating  managers  can  obtain  lower  strike  prices  via 
backdating their options and other strategies rather than manipulating their earnings to 
miss  the  earnings  targets.  Furthermore,  managers  involved  in  backdating  will  be 
cautious not to attract scrutiny of investors triggered by unfavorable earnings surprises 
since they have strong reasons to conceal their backdating behavior.  
My conclusions about the influence of managers’ type on financial reporting 
behavior are conditional on the assumption that all firm characteristic variables related 
with the manager’s type are included in the model. While I follow the prior literature in 
my regression specifications and include many variables that have been identified in 
earlier work, I cannot exclude the possibility that there is an omitted correlated variable 
problem. I also concede that incentives might simultaneously drive backdating behavior 
and managerial reporting patterns. By controlling for incentives in the regression, I 
reduce as much as possible this endogeneity problem (Wooldridge 2002; Nikolaev and 
Van Lent 2005).  
  Despite this issue, this paper is the first to provide evidence that, in addition to 
compensation incentives and firm characteristics, a manager’s type plays a significant 
role in meeting/beating or missing earnings benchmark behavior. Secondly, this paper 
suggests that non-accounting scandals have some implications on accounting issues, 
and  finally  this  paper  adds  to  the  ongoing  discussion  whether  the  conclusion  of 
earnings  management  can  be  gleaned  from  examining  differences  in  benchmark 
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4.7 Appendix 1 Variable definitions 
 
•  Backdating:  This  measure  is  an  indicator  variable  which  equals  one  if  the 
sample firm in a certain year is identified as having its stock options backdated, 
zero otherwise.  
 
•  JMBT1:  This measure is an indicator variable which equals one if earnings 
divided by lagged market value is equal to or larger than 0.00 but less than 0.02; 
zero otherwise.  
 
•  JMBT2: This measure is an indicator variable which equals one if the change in 
earnings divided by lagged market value is equal to or larger than 0.00 but less 
than 0.02; zero otherwise.  
 
•  JMBT3: This measure is an indicator variable  which equals one if a  firm’s 
earnings per share beats or meets the most recent analyst’s forecast in year t by 
less than two cents; zero otherwise.  
 
•  JMST1: This measure is an indicator variable which equals one if  earnings 
divided by lagged market value is less than 0.00 but greater than -0.02; and zero 
otherwise, or, if earnings divided by lagged market value is less than 0.00 and is 
in the lowest quartile for that 2-digit industry for that year; and zero otherwise.  
 
•  JMST2: This measure is an indicator variable which equals one if change in 
earnings divided by lagged market value is less than 0.00 but greater than -0.02; 
zero otherwise, or, if change in earnings divided by lagged market value is less 
than 0.00 and is in the lowest quartile for that industry for that year; and zero 
otherwise.  
 
•  JMST3:  This  measure  is  an  indicator  variable  which  equals  one  if  a  firm’s 
earnings per share miss the most recent analyst’s forecast by less than two cents, 
or, if a firm’s earnings per share miss the most recent analyst’s forecast and is in 
the lowest quartile for that 2-digit industry for that year; and zero otherwise.  110                                  Essays on the Role of Managerial Type in Financial Reporting 
 
•  SOXpost:  This  variable  is  an  indicator  variable  which  equals  one  if  the 
observation is after the end of the second quarter of 2002; zero otherwise.  
 
•  Grantafter: This measure is an indicator variable which equals one if firm ί 
issues  option  grants  to  its  CEO  within  three  months  after  its  earnings 
announcement.  
 
•  Exercise: This measure is defined as the value of options exercised by the CEO 
of firm ί deflated by the CEO’s salary for year t.  
 
•  Options: This variable is defined as the value of options held by the CEO of 
firm ί deflated by the CEO’s salary for year t.  
 
•  Bonus: This variable is defined as the value of bonus gained by the CEO of firm 
ί deflated by the CEO’s salary for year t.  
 
•  Stock: This variable is defined as the value of shares held by the CEO of firm ί 
deflated by the CEO’s salary for year t.  
 
•  Size: This variable is defined as the natural log of firm ί’s total assets at the end 
of year t.  
 
•  MB: This variable is defined as the market value of equity of firm ί divided by 
book value of equity.  
 
•  Leverage: This variable is defined as firm ί’s long-term debt divided by total 
assets at the end of year t. 
 
•  ROA: This variable is defined as firm ί’s earnings divided by total assets at the 
end of year t.  
•  Ferror: This measure is defined as the difference of actual earnings per share 
and the first analyst’s forecast in year t.  Chapter 4   To Miss or To Meet Earnings Benchmarks?                                             111 
 
•  Nest:  This  measure  is  defined  as  the  average  number  of  analyst  following 
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4.8 Appendix 2 firms involved in stock option backdating scandal 
Company name  Start year  End year 
Activision Inc.  1993  2006 
Affiliated Computer Services  -Cl A  1994  2005 
Affymetrix Inc.  1997  1999 
Agile Software  1999  2003 
American Tower Corp.  2005  2006 
Amkor Technology Inc.  1998  2005 
Analog Devices  1998  2001 
Apollo Group Inc.  -Cl A  1994  2005 
Apple Computer Inc.  1997  2002 
Applied Micro Circuits Corp  1998  2002 
Applied Signal Technology  1998  2005 
Aspen Technolog  1996  2004 
Atmel Corp.  1993  2004 
Autodesk Inc.  1998  2006 
Barnes & Noble Inc.  1996  2006 
Bea Systems  1997  2006 
Bed, Bath & Beyond  1998  2004 
Biomet  1996  2006 
Black Box  1995  2002 
Blue Coat Systems Inc.  2000  2004 
Boston Communications Group  1998  2002 
Broadcom Corp.  -Cl A  1998  2003 
Brocade Communications Systems  2000  2004 
Brooks Automation Inc.  1996  2005 
Ca Inc.  1996  2006 
Cablevision Sys Corp.  -Cl A  1997  2002 
Caremark Rx Inc.  1994  2005 
Cec Entertainment Inc.  1989  2005 
Ceradyne Inc.  1997  2003 
Cheesecake Factory Inc.  2000  2006 
Children's Place  2003  2005 
Cirrus Logic Inc.  1997  2005 
Clorox Co/De  1996  2006 
Cnet Networks Inc.  2003  2005 
Computer Sciences Corp.     
Comverse Technology Inc.  1991  2002 
Corinthian Colleges Inc.     
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Crown Castle Intl Corp.  1998  2001 
Cyberonics Inc.  1999  2003 
Delta Petroleum  1997  2004 
Dot Hill Systems Corp.  2000  2003 
Electronic Arts  1997  2006 
Emcore  2000  2003 
Endocare Inc.  1997  2002 
Engineered Support Systems  2000  2006 
Eplus Inc.  1997  2006 
Extreme Networks Inc.     
F5 Networks Inc.  1995  2006 
Forrester Research  1998  2004 
Foundry Networks Inc.  1995  2006 
Getty Images  1999  2002 
Hansen Natural     
Hcc Insurance Holdings  1995  2006 
Healthsouth Corp.  1995  2002 
Home Depot Inc.  1981  2001 
Ibasis  1999  2006 
Insight Enterprises  1996  2006 
Integrated Silicon Solution  1995  2006 
J2 Global Communications Inc.     
Jabil Circuit Inc.  1998  2001 
Juniper Networks Inc.  2003  2006 
Kb Home  1998  2005 
Keithley     
King Pharmaceuticals  2000  2001 
Kla-Tencor Corp.  1991  2005 
Kos Pharmaceuticals Inc.  2001  2003 
L-3 Communications Hldgs Inc.  1998  2006 
Marvell Technology Group Ltd.  2000  2006 
Maxim Integrated Products     
Mcafee Inc.  2000  2002 
Meade Instruments Corp.  1998  2002 
Medarex Inc.  2000  2006 
Mercury Interactive Corp.  1996  2002 
Michaels Stores Inc.  1990  2001 
Microsoft Corp.  1992  1999 
Microtune  2000  2003 
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Molex Inc.  1994  2006 
Monster Worldwide Inc.  1997  2001 
Msystems  2001  2005 
Newpark Resources  2001  2003 
Novell Inc.  1996  2005 
Novellus Systems Inc.  1997  2002 
Nvidia Corp.  2000  2006 
Nyfix Inc.  2000  2006 
Openwave Systems Inc.  1995  2006 
Pediatrix  1995  2001 
Pixar  1997  2001 
Pmc-Sierra Inc.  1998  2001 
Power Integrations Inc.  1999  2004 
Progress Software Corp.  1995  2002 
Quest Software Inc.  2000  2005 
Rambus Inc.  1990  2005 
Redback Networks Inc.     
Renal Care Group Inc.  1997  2002 
Research In Motion  1997  2002 
Restoration Hardware Inc.  2002  2004 
Rsa Security Inc.  1999  2005 
Safenet Inc.  2000  2006 
Sanmina-Sci Corp.  1997  2006 
Sapient  1997  2001 
Semtech Corp.  2002  2006 
Sepracor Inc.  2003  2006 
Sharper Image  2003  2005 
Sigma Designs Inc.  1994  2005 
Silicon Image  2000  2005 
Sonus Networks  2000  2003 
Stolt-Nielsen  2003  2004 
Sunrise Telecom  2001  2005 
Sun-Times Media  1999  2002 
Sycamore Networks Inc.  2000  2005 
Take-Two Interactive Software  1997  2003 
Thq Inc.  1996  2005 
Trident Microsystems Inc.  1995  2004 
Ulticom Inc.  2002  2005 
Unitedhealth Group Inc.  1999  2002 
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Verint Systems Inc.  1991  2002 
Verisign Inc.  2001  2005 
Vitesse Semiconductor Corp.  1995  2006 
Western Digital Corp.  1999  2003 
Wind River      
Witness Systems Inc.  2000  2002 
Zoran Corp.  1997  2005 
Flir Systems  1996  2001 
Altera Corp.  1996  2000 
Asyst Technologies Inc.  1997  2006 
Gap Inc.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 